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Abstract 
The European Union has identified a lack of energy supply security. In terms of importing natural gas, the EU is 
highly dependent on Russia, an energy partner deemed as unreliable by the EU due to multiple reasons. Therefore, 
the EU has stated the objective of improving its energy security, most notably through diversification of energy 
supply. As a solution, the EU is looking at Turkey as an energy transit partner to reduce dependency on Russia. 
But is Turkey a viable solution to the EU’s objective of gaining energy security through diversification of energy 
supply? The literature has yet to pay sufficient attention to the basis political principles which have to be met by 
the EU’s new energy partner. This thesis uses securitization theory and a discourse analysis focused on ‘frames’ 
to demonstrate that the EU acknowledges its threat related to energy security and pushes Turkey forward as their 
new energy partner. Consequently, this research fills the gap in the literature by predominantly focusing on 
political arguments related to Turkey’s (un)stability and (un)reliability to conclude that by hailing Turkey as their 
new energy partner, the EU risks falling into the trap of not learning lessons from the past: Turkey’s reliability 
might be(come) just as problematic as Russia’s.  
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Introduction 
     
Energy is key for our security. We face today in Europe  
the urgent need to strengthen our resilience to supply  
disruptions. The situation in Ukraine has highlighted our  
vulnerabilities and the need to improve security of supply.  
Diversification of routes and suppliers is key in order not to  
be at the mercy of individual suppliers. Let us not forget that  
there is no security without energy security.” 
    Miguel Arias Cañete, 17 November 20141      
 
The availability of energy is crucial for any society to function. Assuring that supply and distribution of energy 
resources are safeguarded forms a top priority for any country. As the last sentence of the above statement of 
European Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Cañete suggests, a suspension of energy supply is seen 
as an existential threat by the European Commission, especially if the main artery for energy supply is controlled 
by a foreign country whose reliability for supply is at least questionable. How is this undesirable dependency to 
be overcome? This is the puzzle the European Union is trying to solve and this forms the subject of this thesis: the 
overarching research area is about energy security for the European Union; the research topic is the (un)reliability 
of Russia and the strategy of diversification of energy supply and, lastly, the research question focuses on the 
viability of Turkey as the EU’s new energy partner through diversification. 
   
In the European Energy Security Strategy, drafted in May 2014, the European Commission raised their concern 
about the European energy mix and therefore, its energy security. Research showed that 53% of the energy 
resources consumed in the European Union are imported, with crude oil (almost 90%) on top, followed by natural 
gas (66%) and solid fuels (42%).2 Russia stands out as the EU’s main supplier for all three of them, with the level 
of 39% for natural gas being the highest. Moreover, six member states rely solely on Russia for their imports of 
natural gas, while for half of these countries natural gas forms a quarter of their total energy mix.3 In other words, 
natural gas forms a crucial part of the total energy mix of the European Union and the majority of it is being 
imported from Russia.  
  The risks of relying heavily on a single energy supplier are obvious: to some extent, the supplier has 
leverage over the consumer. Intentional and unintentional disruptions may have detrimental effects for the 
consumer, which leads to the conclusion that the supplier is able to exert political leverage. The European Union 
experienced two episodes of unintentional gas disruptions due to disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 
and 2009, while the possibility of intentional gas disruptions – energy being used as a political weapon - may have 
increased due to the recent deterioration in EU-Russian relations, most notably due to confrontational approaches 
towards the Ukraine crisis, which started in 2014. In sum, from the EU’s point of view, Russia lacks reliability.  
 Since the two episodes of gas disruptions therefore, the issue of energy security has figured more 
prominently on the EU’s agenda and it was designated as one of the top priorities for the Juncker Commission 
                                                          
1 Cañete, M.A., Speech at ‘Conference on EU Energy Policy and Competitiveness’, as found on: European Commission Press Release 
Database. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-1920_en.htm, accessed 16 March 2016. 
2 European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy (2014) 2. 
3 European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy (2014) 2-3. 
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which took office in 2014. The European Commission has taken the lead in the creation of an Energy Union, with 
the primary goal of ‘giving EU consumers – households and businesses – secure, sustainable, competitive and 
affordable energy’, and relying on each other instead of on external partners, based on ‘solidarity and trust’.4 In 
other words, the EU has stated the objective of solving the problematic lack of energy security. Therefore, the EU 
wishes to mitigate its energy dependency on Russia through various ways, one of which is the topic of this thesis: 
the diversification of energy supply.  
  Diversification of energy supply essentially means that other ‘energy partners’ than Russia should be 
sought and other routes should be explored, in order to secure Europe’s energy supply. Entering into partnerships 
with reliable transit states, as much as with reliable energy suppliers, forms an important part of this diversification 
strategy. In this research, the main focus is on natural gas, as it is consumed in large amounts in the EU, dependency 
levels on Russia are highest, while diversification is rather difficult, given the fact that expensive, long term 
projects for pipeline infrastructure are necessary to facilitate supply. In other words, the problem of a lack of energy 
security is, in the context of natural gas particularly, very much alive.  
  Having established diversification of energy as an important topic within the wider area of EU energy 
security, this thesis focuses on one of the means employed by the EU to increase its security of energy supply: 
Turkey. Turkey has the potential of functioning as the ideal energy transit hub, as it is situated between the EU 
(consumers) and the Caspian countries holding large volumes of natural gas resources, such as Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan (producers). Despite this geographical advantage and other reasons to believe that Turkey would 
constitute a suitable energy partner for the European Union, there are also numerous drawbacks to consider. As 
the EU initiated the diversification strategy due to the fact that it deemed Russia to be politically unreliable as an 
energy supplier, this begs the question whether a partnership with Turkey would be undermined by the same 
reliability issues the EU is currently experiencing with Russia.     
  Turkey witnesses the increasingly authoritarian and capricious leadership of President Erdoğan and the 
deteriorating state of democratic principles with regard to press freedom. Moreover, this is combined with political 
and societal polarization and increasing violence between the Turkish state and several groups on Turkish territory. 
Additionally, creating a viable framework for EU-Turkey cooperation might be more difficult than it seems, as 
they share a long legacy of fruitless negotiations with regard to Turkey’s candidacy for membership of the EU. 
Also, the so-called ‘refugee-deal’ which was struck between the European Union and Turkey, in order to stem the 
influx of Syrian refugees entering the Schengen-area, revealed that the Turkish leadership is capable and willing 
of using the political leverage it obtained through the deal to pressurize the EU to the benefit of their own interests. 
In sum, there certainly are some arguments in favour of an EU-Turkey partnership in energy affairs, but certain 
negative aspects are not to be neglected, if the EU does not wish to invite new problems to their energy agenda.
 Within the context of the wider research area of the EU’s energy security and the narrower topic of the 
diversification of energy supply, the specific research question of this thesis is as follows: is Turkey a viable 
solution to the EU’s objective of gaining energy security through diversification of energy supply? The underlying 
assumptions are based upon the academic literature on EU energy security, Russia and diversification, which 
suggests that the perceived unreliability of Russia is mainly based on political issues.5 For the EU, the reliability 
                                                          
4 Ibidem, 2. 
5 This will be further elaborated upon in the literature review. See for example: Neuman, M., ‘EU-Russian Energy Relations after the 2004-
2007 EU Enlargement: An EU perspective’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18:3 (2010); Feklyunina V., ‘The Great 
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of new energy partners should therefore be considered a top priority. Despite this clear notion, the academic debate 
on Turkey as a reliable partner to the benefit of EU’s energy security has yet to receive sufficient attention, as 
much of the literature focuses on capacity issues and/or issues concerning Turkey’s pending accession process. 
This thesis intends to fill this academic gap by focusing mainly on the (potential) reliability of Turkey as the EU’s 
new energy partner.         
  In order to answer the research question, the following outline for analysis will be maintained. In the first 
chapter after the introduction, the literature review will a) review the debate on EU energy security; b) the strategy 
of diversification; c) and on Turkey’s role in this respect. Most importantly, it will present the gap this thesis 
intends to fill. The theoretical foundation, methodological considerations and the research method of choice will 
be outlined in the second chapter. The social-constructivist theory of securitization will serve as the theoretical 
basis. Securitization theory was created by the ‘Copenhagen School’ and can be explained as the process of an 
escalation of an often already politicized issue to an existential threat through discourse. A specific type of 
discourse analysis, ‘framing’, serves as the primary research method and will be executed in the empirical analyses 
in the fifth and sixth chapter. 
  The third chapter gives an introduction to the rationale behind current developments in the EU’s strategy 
for improving its energy security and elaborates on diversification as one of its central components. In the fourth 
chapter, an overview will be given of EU energy relations with the two EU energy partners in focus in this thesis: 
Russia and Turkey. Essential elements within this chapter include the reasons why the EU seeks to diversify its 
natural gas supply away from Russia and why the EU instead looks at Turkey as a new energy partner. In this 
respect, the EU is not seeking to replace Russia with Turkey, which is virtually impossible given the current trade 
volumes and infrastructure, but instead focuses on attracting energy supply through alternative energy partners, 
like Turkey.  
 In the fifth chapter, a ‘framing’ analysis is conducted in order to establish how the European Commission 
constructs images of the energy relations between the EU and Russia on the one hand, and between the EU and 
Turkey on the other. Documentation published by the Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER) between 2006 
and 2016 will be analysed, in order to discern similarities and differences between Russia and Turkey in the use 
of four frames – security, economic, environmental and political – by the European Commission and to analyse 
whether and how the European Commission puts forward Turkey as an energy security partner. In the final and 
sixth chapter, the desirability of a proposed energy partnership between the EU and Turkey is tested against the 
recent internal occurrences in Turkey and the external developments in EU-Turkey relations.  
  In the conclusion, an overview of the main findings and a definitive answer to the research question based 
upon the findings of this research will be given. It will be argued that the stated objective of gaining energy security 
through diversification of energy supply and the solution, which is an energy partnership with Turkey, do not align, 
mainly due to the fact that evidence from Turkey suggests it may well suffer from the same reliability issues 
towards the EU as Russia. 
 
                                                          
Diversification Game: Russia’s Vision of the European Union’s Energy Projects in the Shared Neighbourhood’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 4:2 (2008) 130-148; 130-1. 
7 
 
Chapter 1     Literature Review: On the EU’s search for energy security 
The introduction outlined what the subject and scope of this research is, identifying the key debates and the 
contribution of this thesis in respects of those debates. This literature review identifies the existing gap in the 
literature on the strategy of diversification within the EU’s objective to improve its energy security. First, an 
overview of the debate on EU energy security will be given. In the second part, the literature on the strategy of 
diversification within EU energy security and the role Turkey could play in this respect is analysed. In this section, 
I will argue that while many scholars have aptly shaped the debate and many valuable insights have been provided, 
lacunae still exist. Therefore, I will lastly outline why this research adds to the existing literature on EU energy 
security, Turkey and the diversification strategy. 
 
1.1 Debates on EU energy security 
What is meant by ‘EU energy security?’ For the EU, energy security revolves around the notion that member states 
have secured sufficient levels of energy sources for the benefit of their own prosperity. The EU’s long search for 
energy security has resulted in a wide array of academic contributions on this topic. This world of literature can 
be categorised into several areas, depending on the issue focused upon. Dyer & Trombetta have aptly argued in 
this respect that discourse on ‘energy security’ itself consists of a multitude of political, economic, environmental 
and human security considerations.6  
  Broadly speaking, there are two schools in the literature to distinguish: those who focus on the EU’s 
internal issues - the member states maintaining varying interests and concerns - and those who aim at the EU’s 
external issues on energy security, meaning its relations with energy partners. In this research, the literature on 
both aspects is valuable. A review of the scholarly work has revealed that the majority of scholars focus on political 
aspects and argue, in broad terms, that both internally and externally the politics of securing energy have proved 
to be the major obstacle for the EU in achieving progress – internally with regard to trying to bring together the 
various interests of the 28 member states, externally with regard to the difficulty of establishing sustainable 
partnerships with external suppliers, mainly Russia, to guarantee a secure supply of energy. This will be 
demonstrated underneath. 
    The difficulties between the EU member states to align their interests and concerns on energy policy has 
been elaborated upon by Correljé & van der Linde, Braun and Neuman, amongst others. The “internal dichotomy” 
between the member states consists of a divide between the Western (old) and Eastern (new) European countries, 
as Correljé & van der Linde and Braun argued.7 Although energy policy acquired a legal position through the 
Lisbon Treaty, energy remained ‘business as usual’, according to Braun, meaning that EU-coordinated action on 
energy security would not materialize soon.8 These internal differences have led to differing preferences with 
regard to the external dimension of energy security as well, especially with regard to the choice of energy partners. 
Diverging views on (energy) relations with the EU’s most important energy partner, Russia, form the biggest 
stumbling block for any common energy policy, since for some countries, economic consequences stand lower in 
hierarchy than political (geostrategic) considerations, meaning that especially the former Soviet satellite states are 
                                                          
6 Dyer, H., & Trombetta, M.J., International Handbook of Energy Security (Cheltenham 2013) 13. 
7 Neuman, M., ‘EU-Russian Energy Relations after the 2004-2007 EU Enlargement: An EU perspective’, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies 18:3 (2010) 341-6; Correljé, A., van der Linde, C., ‘Energy Supply Security and geopolitics: a European perspective’, 
Energy Policy 34 (2006) 532-543. 
8 Braun, ‘EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules: Between a new policy and business as usual’, EPIN Working Paper No.31 
(2011) 8-9. 
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willing to sacrifice some economic interests in return for less dependence on Russia, while others prefer to continue 
their business as usual.9 An important addition to this side of the debate has been the analysis of Russia using 
energy as “the instrument of an effective Realpolitik”, which has been argued for instance by Wood and relates to 
Russia’s use of energy as a political weapon.10 In combination with the episodes of gas supply disruptions, Russia 
has been deemed an unreliable energy partner and a threat to EU energy security - in turn, this has had its effect 
on the EU’s energy security strategy. These conclusions are of great importance for this research, since they 
underline that politics and geo-strategy indeed form crucial components in the EU’s internal and external policy 
on energy security. This research builds upon these primary notions, which will be further explained below. 
  Next to the scholarly work mainly directed to political arguments, economic arguments in energy security 
are brought forward in the debate as well, for example by scholars who wish to adopt a more ‘comprehensive’ 
approach. These accounts reject overemphasizing political arguments and point to the importance of economic 
cooperation between the EU and Russia as favourable to energy security. This is demonstrated for instance by 
Nikolaj Kaveshnikov11, but the importance of balancing various (political and economic) arguments in energy 
security research has also been argued by the already mentioned Dyer & Trombetta.12 In the current research, the 
framing analysis in chapter 3 of energy agreements between the EU and Russia supports the importance of 
economic cooperation on energy and therefore underlines a comprehensive approach. However, my research 
points out that political arguments play a much more important role in the EU’s strategy on energy security than 
the economic arguments.  
   
Within the area of EU energy security, as already underlined, a prime topic of existing research is the EU’s strategy 
of diversification of energy supply. This strategy is aimed towards mitigating dependency on Russia, by 
constructing energy partnership with alternative partners to secure alternative supply of energy. In terms of 
research design, this thesis fits with the political discourse analysis of Kratochvil & Tichy on ‘dominant 
interpretations of the EU-Russian energy relations’. They identify three key concepts within which discussions on 
the question of energy security takes place: integration, liberalization and diversification. They conclude first that 
although both parties use the same ‘themes’ in their discourses, their interpretation differs greatly, most notably 
on diversification: the EU maintains that diversification should take place vis-à-vis the country of origin, while 
Russia upholds that not the supplier state but certain transit countries pose the problem.13 In addition, the authors 
found that the discourse on integration of EU and Russian energy policies is dominant, instead of diversification 
and liberalization. Therefore, they also conclude that the alleged securitization of energy policy is ‘highly 
exaggerated’, since security is not the dominant ‘frame’ within which discourse on energy relations with Russia is 
being conveyed.14 Kratochvil and Tichy’s research shows the suitability of using discourse analysis and 
securitization theory together to assess the communication of relations between the EU and an external energy 
partner. Although my research has a different focus, as is it directed to both Russia and Turkey, it builds upon the 
same connection of theory and methods to identify how, in a politicized/securitized issue such as energy security, 
                                                          
9 De Jong J., & Van der Linde, C., ‘EU Energy Policy in a supply-constrained world’, European Policy Analysis 11 (2008) 1-9; 8-9. 
10 Wood, S., ‘Europe’s Energy Politics’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 18:3 (2010) 307-322; 313-4. 
11 Kaveshnikov, N., ‘The Issue of Energy Security in Relations between Russia and the European Union’, European Security 19:4 (2010) 
585-605; 601-2. 
12 Dyer, H., & Trombetta, M.J., International Handbook of Energy Security (Cheltenham 2013) 13. 
13 Kratochvíl P., & Tichy L., ‘EU and Russian discourse on energy relations’, Energy Policy 56 (2013) 391-406; 394-6.   
14 Ibidem, 391, 395-6. 
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the discourse used by the central actors is crucial in identifying how constructed images of energy partners come 
to life and how discourse can reveal the intentions and preoccupations of policy makers. 
  In the previous section, an overview was given of the academic debate on EU energy security, which 
showed the dominance of political arguments and from which several arguments were discerned as useful 
principles and guidelines for this research. This thesis now turns to the EU’s objective to reduce its vulnerability 
in energy supply due to its heavy reliance on Russia, by engaging in energy relations with other energy partners, 
such as Turkey. 
    
1.2 Turkey’s role in EU energy policy 
The previous section showed the challenges associated with the EU’s reliance on Russia for its energy supply, 
including the concerns of certain (central and eastern) European member states about Russia’s unreliability. The 
insights of that literature, along with the EU’s own diversification strategy, have seen the emergence of more 
scholarly work and debate about Turkey’s role in the EU energy security domain. Sources here are scarcer, yet the 
debate is lively.  
  A review of the debate reveals that the majority of the scholars engaged in this subject point to the two-
sided nature of an EU-Turkey partnership in the context of the EU’s diversification strategy: on the one hand, they 
underline the potential of the partnership, on the other they foresee considerable obstacles as well. The various 
academic works of Barysch, Müftüler-Baç & Başkan, Koranyi & Sartori and Tekin & Williams serve as examples 
of this notion. Barysch vividly advocated Turkey’s potential as an energy corridor in 2007. She reckoned it to be 
beneficial for both sides: Europe would fulfil its objective for diversification of energy supply, while Turkey would 
not only benefit financially through transit fees, but would also “be able to prove that it is an indispensable partner 
for, and eventually part of, the European Union”.15 Müftüler-Baç & Başkan followed this line of reasoning and 
added that a critical element in this respect is Russia: as long as energy dependency on Russia is high and its 
unreliability is still felt in the EU, there will be arguments in favour of Turkey and the EU forming a partnership 
in the context of diversification of energy supply routes for the EU.16 An important element in the debate on EU-
Turkey energy cooperation is the problematic connection between setting up a new partnership and Turkey’s 
pending accession process. For instance, Koranyi & Sartori and Tekin & Williams have pointed to this adequately, 
with a slightly different focus between them. The former concluded that as long as Turkey maintains its stance of 
negotiating an energy partnership only within the difficult context of accession and not, as proposed by the EU, 
within the context of the Energy Community, progress on energy cooperation will be hard to achieve17, while the 
latter assessed that energy cooperation and the accession process hold each other hostage: as long as energy 
cooperation is being connected to the accession process, Turkish opportunism is confronted with European 
reluctance.18 
  The previous section showed that a driving force behind the EU’s strategy on energy security is the need 
to reduce dependency on Russia due to issues of reliability. The debate therefore focuses predominantly on political 
                                                          
15 Barysch, K., ‘Turkey’s role in European energy security’, Centre for European Reform Essays (2007) 1-8; 1; Barysch, K., ‘Can Turkey 
combine EU accession and regional leadership?’, Centre for European Reform Essays (2010) 1-11; 8-11. 
16 Müftüler-Baç & Başkan, ‘The Future of Energy Security for Europe: Turkey’s Role as an Energy Corridor, Middle Eastern Studies 47:2 
(2011) 361-378; 375-6. 
17 Koranyi, D., & Sartori, N., ‘EU-Turkey Relations in the Context of EU Accession Negotiations: Focus on Natural Gas’, Working Paper 
05 by Atlantic Council Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center & Instituto Affari Internazionali (December 2013) 2-7. 
18 Tekin A., & Williams P.A., Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus. The European Union, Russia and Turkey (Palgrave Macmillan 
2011) 186. 
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issues. The strategy of diversification of energy supply is intrinsically connected to the EU’s choice of another 
energy partner and it is here where the opportunities and obstacles to Turkey as an energy partner come into play. 
While the academic debate on Turkey’s potentially important role in the EU’s strategy for diversification has 
provided several valuable insights, it has also left certain gaps to fill. Many scholars focus on the political 
difficulties on constructing the energy partnership in relation to Turkey’s pending accession process. This thesis 
argues that, besides this veritable argument, there are other and more important political arguments to give why 
engaging in an energy partnership with Turkey will not fully solve the EU’s objective of enhancing its energy 
security through diversification away from Russia. The academic gap to be filled by this thesis becomes more 
apparent if compared with the excellent research conducted by Simone Tagliapietra. 
  Tagliapietra has published several accounts on Turkey’s prospect of becoming the EU’s new energy 
partner in recent years. In “Myth or Reality?”, he analysed Turkey’s potential as an energy hub from a resource-
based perspective.19 By focusing on the (potential of the) gas markets around Turkey, Tagliapietra concludes that 
in the medium to long term (up to 2020-2025) Turkey will most probably not become an energy hub, while in the 
long-term (after 2025-2030) this is still “highly uncertain”.20 Here, however, the political arguments for 
diversification, i.e. reducing dependency on the unreliable energy partner Russia, are largely absent. In another 
contribution Tagliapietra did focus on political arguments and the political undesirability of Russia as an energy 
partner and the potential of Turkey, but here directed her research predominantly towards the “end-game” in EU-
Turkey energy cooperation, arguing in favour of a new “EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative” to break the policy 
deadlock between them, instead of focusing on the ground rules for cooperation.21 In essence, Tagliapietra raises 
an important concern but then invests little time in investigating it. The political argument thus remains under-
researched, a gap which this thesis seeks to fill. 
  This thesis argues that past experience with Russia shows that before the EU is to think about problems 
considering gas capacity and infrastructure, and frameworks for cooperation, it should focus on the basic political 
arguments regarding its strategy of diversification and which political criteria should be met by the new energy 
partner. It furthermore shows that despite the veritable arguments of following a strategy of diversification in 
energy supply with Turkey, the EU risks becoming engaged in another hazardous partnership, with a partner whose 
political unreliability might be similar to that attributed to Russia.   
 
1.3 Concluding remarks 
Concluding, a review of the literature on EU energy security and its strategy for diversification has shown that in 
broad terms, the politics of energy security has proved to be the major obstacle in achieving progress. This is 
related to both internal arguments, dealing with the various interests and concern of the 28 member states, as well 
as external arguments, mainly dealing with various views on the EU’s overreliance on awkward partner Russia. 
Within this field of research, the topic of this thesis is one of the possible solutions to reducing energy dependency 
on Russia opted by the European Commission: the diversification of energy supply. Here, the debate has proved 
to be varied and many insights, such as Tagliapietra’s, have shaped the debate and prove to be valuable. However, 
the review also exposed that there still are gaps to be filled. This thesis analyses why an energy partnership with 
                                                          
19 Tagliapietra, S., ‘Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub: Myth or Reality’, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2014) 2-32; 3-8. 
20 Tagliapietra, S., ‘Turkey as a Regional Natural Gas Hub: Myth or Reality’, 29. 
21 Tagliapietra, S., ‘The EU-Turkey Energy Relations After the 2014 Ukraine Crisis’, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2014) 2-17; 11-16. 
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Turkey can indeed have a positive effect on reducing dependency on Russian energy, while simultaneously the 
EU is at risk of becoming entangled in the same set of desirability and reliability issues with Turkey as it is 
currently experiencing with Russia. 
  In the next chapter, the theoretical and methodological foundations and the choice of method of this 
research will be outlined, before we proceed to the core of this analysis. 
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Chapter 2       Foundations: Theory, Methodology & Methods 
The subject, scope and structure of this research were outlined in the introduction. Following upon this prelude, a 
review of the scholarly work on EU energy security, the strategy of diversification and Turkey’s role in this respect 
was provided. Also, the gap within the academic debate this analysis intends to fill was presented. Before the 
analysis of EU energy security with regard to Russia and Turkey can take place, it is necessary to establish the 
theoretical and methodological frameworks. The two are intertwined: certain research methods enhance the 
underlying theoretical argument, while a theoretical framework may beg for the use of particular research methods. 
It is up to the researcher to define his theoretical position and to find supporting and complementary research 
methods. In this short chapter, the chosen theory, the complementing methodological direction and choice of 
method will be elaborated upon.  
2.1 Securitization theory 
As the introduction and the literature review highlighted, the research area of this thesis is energy security. 
Therefore, theorising on security is essential as it sets the theoretical framework within which this research is 
conducted. For this thesis, the theory of securitization forms the theoretical backbone. Securitization adheres to 
security studies within the wider framework of international relations research. It was developed by Buzan, Waever 
and De Wilde of the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’ in the early 1990s and belongs to the school of social-
constructivism, the central premise of which is that any given reality is subject to interpretation and thus 
constructed.22 As opposed to traditional views on security studies, social-constructivists argue that “institutions 
and organisations must be understood in a non-linear manner, by revealing their multi-faceted and permanently 
changing nature” and, most importantly, they conclude that reality is not a given, but constructed through particular 
understanding and interpretation by an individual or a group.23  
  Securitization theorists have argued for revisiting and broadening the scope of security studies. In their 
view, not only the military sector, but also the political, economic, environmental and societal sectors can be 
subjects of research on security.24 What ‘security’ actually means in their research context, is clarified in the 
introduction to Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998): 
 
  Security is about survival. It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential  
   threat to a designated referent object [e.g. the state, or society]. The special nature  
   of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.25 
 
So, what is securitization? First of all, securitization is a social process. A commonly used definition holds that the 
process of securitization is initiated by a ‘securitizing actor’, an actor with authority over its audience, who “uses 
a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is ‘normal politics’”.26 
What constitutes ‘an existential threat’ obviously differs per sector: in the political sector and related to the EU, it 
might be a threat towards the integration process as a whole.27   
                                                          
22 Bobulesen, R., ‘Critical Realism versus Social Constructivism in International Relations’, The Journal of Philosophical Economies 4:2, 
37-64, 38-9. 
23 Bobulesen, R., ‘Critical Realism versus Social Constructivism in International Relations’ 58-9.  
24 Buzan, B., Waever., O. & De Wilde, J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London 1998) preface, vii. 
25 Buzan, B., Waever., O. & De Wilde, J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis 21. 
26 Balzacq, T., Léonard, S. & Ruzicka J., “Securitization’ revisited: Theory and cases’, International Relations (2015) 1-38, 2. 
27 Buzan, B., Waever., O. & De Wilde, J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis 22. 
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  Buzan, Waever and De Wilde argue that securitization is a step further than politicization – a step in 
which a certain issue is made into public policy and decisions are made by the government. It is an escalation, in 
which the given issue is taken “beyond the established rules of the game” and “is framed as a special kind of 
politics”.28 Its constructivist disposition lies in the central importance of the so-called ‘securitization speech-acts’: 
the expressions of securitizing actors with authority towards the audience, which highlight the threat and prioritize 
the threatened issue, or ‘referent object’, at stake.29  The issue is as such constructed and represented as a threat. 
The speech-act must be transferred by the securitizing actor and, moreover, must be accepted by the audience of 
the speech-act: “a successful speech-act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of 
speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech”.30 
  Despite its importance in discussing security threats in a new perspective, the theory of securitization has 
also been confronted with criticism: according to Skidmore, language is being overemphasized with regard to 
capacity for action and the supposed difference between ‘the realms of politics and security’ is not clear enough 
and hard to use in practice31, while McDonald argued that the securitization framework is too narrow in three 
different ways (the form, the context and the nature of the act), which results in “a conceptualisation of security 
politics as inherently negative and reactionary.”32 These are fair reservations, for they highlight one of the main 
challenges of using securitization as a theoretical basis: how to assess meticulously when, how or why an issue 
has been securitized, is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conclude objectively. It is very much open for the 
interpretation of the researcher. Due to this reason, this research does not aim to assess how or why energy security 
has been securitized, but instead focuses on the implications of securitization: the escalation of energy security 
becoming one of the top policy priorities for the European Commission. 
  In securitization studies, the researcher’s goal is to establish who performs the securitization (speech-) 
act, for whom and why.33 Furthermore, the researcher is tasked with determining whether the ‘referent object’ 
indeed has been prioritized on the national or, in the case of the EU, communal policy agenda. Turning to the 
subject of this research, the social-constructivist theory of securitization forms a useful starting point for analysis 
of EU energy security and the particular roles of Russia and Turkey, since energy security has recently moved up 
the EU policy agenda. However, it is not the purpose of this analysis to scrutinize speech acts and provide a 
definitive answer to the question of securitization. This research is mainly focused on the implications of this 
process of securitization: the issue of energy security is prioritized as a ‘threat’ by the European Commission, 
which in turn has resulted in significant policy changes in the EU, one of which is the topic of this thesis: 
diversification of energy supply. This thesis therefore focuses mainly on the politics of energy security, and not on 
economics or the technical aspects related to energy security, since the mentioned ‘threat’ to energy security is 
mainly caused by political issues on Russia’s reliability. The insights of securitization theory remain relevant in 
this political approach, especially the central concept of an ‘existential threat’ and its construction through specific 
discourse. Russia is considered to constitute an ‘existential threat’ to the EU, evidenced by the priority given to 
improving the EU’s energy security. 
                                                          
28 Ibidem, 23-4. 
29 Ibidem, 26; Williams, M., ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003) 
511-531, 513. 
30 Buzan, B., Waever., O. & De Wilde, J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis 32. 
31 Skidmore, D., ‘Review of Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998)’, The American Political Science Review 93:4 (1999) 1010-
1011, 1011. 
32 McDonald, M., ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, European Journal of International Relations 14:4 (2008) 563-587, 563-
4. 
33 Buzan, B., Waever., O. & De Wilde, J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis 32. 
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  This thesis uses elements of social constructivism and securitization theory, in combination with discourse 
analysis and ‘framing’, to examine the construction of the images of both Russia and Turkey as energy partners of 
the European Union. The ‘securitizing actor’ is represented by the European Commission and the ‘referent object’, 
the threat, is European security of energy supply. An energy partnership with Turkey is being presented as a means 
to diminish the threat coming from Russia. This thesis evaluates this notion by comparing what is said in the Russia 
case with what is said in the Turkish case, looking for evidence of whether the EU’s objective (securing energy 
supply by diversifying energy supply) is consistent with its proposed solution (building an energy partnership with 
Turkey). This requires an examination not only of what the EU says in relation to Turkey as a reliable energy 
partner but also to what other evidence points us to in this regard. 
  In this section I have elaborated on what securitization is and emphasized the fact that it is not to be seen 
objectively: the ‘speech act’, for instance, is a discursive, social-constructivist notion and securitization is a 
conscious and intentional act. In the context of this research, this is a crucial notion. This research investigates the 
presence of intentional and conscious acts of framing by the EU through their policy documents on energy: vis-à-
vis Russia in a more malign fashion, as it is deemed to constitute the core problem, and vis-à-vis Turkey in a more 
benign fashion, since it is considered to be part of the solution. It is to be expected that Turkey will be presented 
as a more reliable and stable partner for energy security, since it forms a crucial part of the EU’s strategy for 
diversification. Whether this strategy towards Turkey evaluates the reliability issues towards Russia and Turkey 
on a equal level and is therefore fit to serve as a viable solution to the problem of energy security is the topic of 
this research. However, research aimed at EU framing towards Russia and Turkey has to be executed, before 
conclusions on these issues can be drawn, which will be dealt with in chapter 5. 
The theory of securitization leads to the use of certain methodological approaches, more specifically 
discourse analysis. The next section will therefore explain the basic principles of discourse analysis, before 
proceeding to the precise method of choice in relation to discourse analysis: framing. 
 
2.2 Discourse analysis and methodological considerations 
Discourse analysis focuses on the particular manner language is used and what the purpose of this use is, within a 
particular social context. It is social-constructivist in nature since it deems that the language we use does not 
“neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play[s] an active role in creating and 
changing them.”34 Discourse itself is therefore an immensely broad term which refers to “all aspects of 
communication – not only its content, but its author (who says it?), its authority (on what grounds?), its audience 
(to whom?) [and] its objective (in order to achieve what?)”.35 Because of its intrinsic relationship with the particular 
social setting in which discourse is being used, the same language can mean different things in different social 
environments.36 Also, discourse analysis can be utilized in a wide variety of disciplines and in many varying 
approaches, both on macro- and micro-levels. For example, Glynos et al. identified six different approaches, 
ranging from political discourse theory, related to Foucault’s ideas on relations between power and discourse; to 
                                                          
34 Jörgensen, M. & Phillips, L.J., Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London 2002) 1-2. 
35 Punch, K., Introduction to Social Research. Quantitative & Qualitative Approaches (London 1998) 226. 
36 Punch, Introduction to Social Research, 227. 
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discursive psychology, related to phenomena nominating formerly “inner mental processes” as discursive 
processes; and interpretive policy analysis37, aimed at revealing: 
 
   the importance of notions like narratives, storylines, frames, 
   discourse coalitions, interpretation, argumentation and meaning 
  to critically explain (…) public policies in various contexts and 
  settings.38 
 
This thesis is related to this last approach, as it is focused on interpreting public policy in the context of EU energy 
security and the EU’s strategy of diversification. In the next section, I will elaborate about framing in public policy, 
the research method of choice for this thesis. 
 
2.3 Discovering frames in EU official discourse 
Thus far, it was explained that securitization theory links to discourse analysis through its social-constructivist 
nature and the importance of language used (“speech acts”). Within the broad church that discourse analysis 
constitutes, I have chosen ‘framing’ as an appropriate research method to discern which elements, or ‘frames’ are 
dominant in EU official discourse on energy security with regard to Russia and Turkey. The literature review 
showed that energy security can be talked about in different ways and there are different ‘frames’ being used. For 
a definition of what the method of framing entails, I resort to the explanation of Entman:  
    
   To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality  
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such  
a way as to promote a particular problem definition,  
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment  
recommendation for the item described.39 
 
Studies on ‘frames’ focus on how a certain issue is being communicated by an actor to an audience and how thus 
an image of the issue is constructed in a particular way, predominantly by looking at the discourse used. Yet, it is 
less focused on certain very specific words and more on general frameworks: through which particular ‘pair of 
glasses’ is the issue to be seen? Research on framing is used regularly in media studies, where researchers attempt 
to detect how the process of framing works in mass media: how do they influence public opinion through their 
‘construction’ of their information through particular frames? Naturally, media frames can vary according to the 
topic. For example, in her study on international media coverage on the war in Kosovo in the ‘90s, Camaj 
distinguished between the ‘conflict’ news frame, the ‘human interest’ frame, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ 
frame, the ‘economic consequences’ frame and the ‘morality’ frame, of which the first one proved to be most 
dominant in western media.40 
  This study, however, does not deal with media framing, but instead focuses on politics and policy. Similar 
to how particular news frames have an influence as to how a certain issue is portrayed in the media and thus 
conveyed to the public, a framing analysis of policy documents can reveal which message a policy maker is trying 
                                                          
37 Glynos et al., ‘Discourse analysis: varieties and methods’, Review paper ESRC National Centre for Research Methods NCRM/014 (2009) 
1-41. 
38 Glynos et al., ‘Discourse analysis: varieties and methods’ 20-1. 
39 Entman, R., ‘Framing: Toward clariﬁcation of a fractured paradigm’, Journal of Communication 43:4 (1993) 51-58, 51-2.   
40 Camaj, L., ‘Media framing through stages of a political discourse: International news agencies’ coverage of Kosovo’s status negotiations’, 
The International Communications Gazette 72:7 (2010) 635-653, 642-6. 
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to convey and which frames are dominant in this perspective.41 How things are framed is relevant in understanding 
the hierarchy of priorities for the policy maker. While performing discourse and specifically framing analysis, 
however, the writer has to be aware of certain obvious pitfalls, of which in my case bias towards one of the two 
countries is the most dangerous one. As it was not possible to use computer programmes for digitalized discourse 
and/or content analysis, I resorted to manual analysis of a reasonable sample of carefully selected sources, focusing 
on multiple facets influencing the frame, such as the specific discourse used, the placing, which indicates hierarchy 
of the different frames used in the same document, and the share of specific discourse in light of the whole 
document.   
  The central actor constructing the image is the European Commission. I resorted solely to documents 
published by the European Commission due to their policy competence in energy affairs, which became a shared 
competence between the EU and the member states through the Treaty of Lisbon. Documents by DG ENER on 
energy security strategy, published in between around 2006 and the present day, form the primary sources for 
analysis, such as ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’ (2006), the ‘Second 
Strategic Energy Review (2008), ‘EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Borders’ (2011), the 
‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (2014) and the ‘Energy Union Framework Strategy’ (2015). As I wished to 
discern similarities and differences between EU discourse on both Russia and Turkey as energy partners, I   
scrutinized EU documentation specifically related to both countries as well and selected all the documents related 
to energy security published over the course of the last ten years to which I had (online) access, which has resulted 
in a comprehensive account. For Russia, I resorted to reports on Commission documents such as the EU Russia 
Energy Dialogue (2006-2011), the EU Russia Strategic Review Forecast (2011) and the Roadmap for EU Russia 
energy cooperation until 2050 (2013). In the case of Turkey, sources were scarcer as, unlike the EU and Russia, 
cooperation in energy affairs between the EU and Turkey is still a fresh field of policy. This fact constraint the 
choice of documentation. In the case of Turkey, I therefore resorted to the European Commission’s Turkey 
Progress Reports on Turkey’s accession (2006-2015), the ‘EU Turkey Energy Action Document’ (2015) and 
documentation on the Positive Agenda (2012), the Southern Gas Corridor (2015) and the High Level Energy 
Dialogue (2016). Given that the aim is to examine the EU’s construction of its discourse and policy in relation to 
achieving diversification of energy supply and therefore security of energy supply, in the selection for documents 
language barriers with regard to Russian or Turkish sources did not function as constraints. The current selection 
of documents consists of all web-based, English sources accessible through official EU websites.  
  The central aim of the analysis is to detect how the partnerships with each of the countries are established 
by the EU and correspond with or differs from the other. The framing analysis is a key element in the pursuit of 
answering the research question, as it attempts to show how the European Commission, in their attempt to reduce 
dependency on Russia through diversification of energy supply, is stressing the suitability of Turkey as a beneficial 
actor for the EU’s energy security. In order to approach the analysis of documents related to both countries 
systematically, four possible frames were established. On the one hand, they are based on the evidence stemming 
from the literature review that in energy security debates arguments dealing with politics and economics are most 
                                                          
41 For example, Baumgartner & Mahoney analysed the ‘two faces of framing’ in policy-making in the European Union, arguing that for 
effective framing analysis, both framing at the individual level and the process of collective issue definition should be considered as they are 
inter-related. Baumgartner, F. & Mahoney., C., ‘The Two Faces of Framing. Individual-Level Framing and Collective Issue Definition in the 
European Union’, European Union Politics 9:3 (2008) 435-449.  
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dominant. On the other hand, I have based the frames on a first ‘scan’ of the used documentation. In that respect, 
a combination of deduction and induction was employed. 
  First of all, the security frame entails that partnership with the given country is based upon considerations 
of security (e.g. of energy supply); secondly, the economic frame entails that cooperation is viewed through an 
economic scope, dealing with efficiency, cost- and benefit-driven arguments for partnership and thirdly, the 
partnership may be viewed through an environmental scope, which entails that environmental considerations link 
the two countries. The fourth one, the political frame, is a more generic one than the three frames already 
mentioned and deals with intergovernmental relations and balances of power between countries. Decisions based 
on security, economic or environmental considerations are in the end political decisions and therefore, the political 
frame is very often present underneath a more evident use of a security, economic or environmental frame. 
Connecting this notion to securitization theory brings forward the difficulty of establishing the difference between 
politicization and securitization: what constitutes the difference is not only open to interpretation, but the political 
statements themselves are also not always that clearly apparent in the analysed texts. The outcome of these 
premises on frames will be presented in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3  EU energy security strategy: diversification of energy supply 
The introduction elaborated on the research area, topic and question of this research, and provided insight into the 
outline. Then, the literature review identified the key debates in energy security, the diversification of energy 
supply and the different roles Russia and Turkey play in this respect and, most importantly, identified the gap in 
the literature this research intends to fill. This was followed by an elaboration on securitization theory, as well as 
on methodological considerations regarding discourse analysis. Finally, the use of ‘framing’ was introduced as the 
research method of choice. In sum, the stage is set for this thesis. 
  This chapter offers the necessary context to the identified research area and topic: it briefly outlines the 
rise of energy security within EU energy policy and highlights the primary position of diversification of energy 
supply as part of EU energy security strategy.   
 
3.1 EU energy security as part of EU energy policy 
Energy security is a central component of EU energy policy, which has evolved over decades into one of the top 
priorities for the European Commission. Cooperation in energy affairs on the EU level started as early as the 1950s, 
with the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) alongside the European Economic 
Community (EEC), in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In the preamble of the treaty establishing Euratom, the Six (the 
then-member states) recognised the positive effect on both industrial development and the prime goal of upholding 
peace that the coupling and development of atomic energy could have.42 Despite several energy crises in the 1960s 
and 1970s, energy policy for decades remained largely a national affair.43 
  These energy crises, however, did unlock the concept of ‘energy security’ within the realm of energy 
policy, related to stable and secure supply of energy. Worries on energy security can be summarized by two fears 
amongst European policy-makers: the first one being that the supply of energy resources is affected by regional 
tensions and/or domestic turmoil in producer countries, with a disruption of the flow of energy as an ‘unintended’ 
consequence. The second fear stems from foreign policy considerations by producer countries, in cases where 
energy supply is being used as a political weapon, which happened in the oil crisis of 1973/4.44  
  European initiatives stemming both from national governments and the European institutions to combat 
these fears slowly materialized into results. The end of the Cold War resulted in new opportunities for cooperation 
between Western and Eastern European countries in a new, multilateral framework on a multitude of topics, 
including energy.45 Within the EU, the European Commission proved to be the driving force behind new initiatives 
for energy cooperation between the member states and formulated three fundamental pillars for an EU energy 
policy: sustainability, competitiveness (on an internal and external market) and security of supply.46 
  Quintessential to the recent rise of energy security as a central component within energy policy were the 
two episodes of gas supply disruptions from Russia to the EU in 2006 and 2009, due to price disputes on gas 
                                                          
42 European Union (Publications Office), Preamble, Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community 1957 (2010) 5. 
43 Turner, L., ‘The Politics of the Energy Crisis’, International Affairs 50:3 (1974) 404-415; 404, 407-9, 413-5. 
44 Hoogeveen F. & Perlot W., ‘The EU’s Policies on Security of Energy Supply Towards the Middle East and Caspian Region: Major Power 
Politics?’, 485-8. 
45 An example in this respect was the creation of the Energy Charter Treaty. For a detailed discussion, see: Tekin & Williams, Geo-politics of 
the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus. The European Union, Russia and Turkey (London 2010) 21-2. See also: The International Energy Charter and 
Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty with related documents (January 2016), as found on:  
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf, accessed 8 April 2016.  
46 Tekin & Williams, Geo-politics of the Euro-Asia Energy Nexus, 18. Or, as Hoogeveen & Perlot argued, ‘Secure’, ‘environmentally sound’ 
and ‘economically affordable’. Hoogeveen & Perlot, ‘The EU’s Policies on Security of Energy Supply Towards the Middle East and Caspian 
Region: Major Power Politics?’ 487. 
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between Russia and Ukraine. Not only did these gas shocks result in an “an outcry all over Europe”47, they also 
resulted in recognition within the EU of their energy vulnerability and proved to be detrimental to the image of 
Russia as a reliable supplier of energy, as Pirani, Stern and Yafimava aptly noted: 
 
   it does not matter very much to Europe which side was at fault for  
   this crisis. The issue for the future is that since Russian gas supplies  
   through Ukraine have been cut off once, they could be cut off again.  
   Thus the problem for both sides is one of credibility in relation 
to future supplies and transit.48 
 
 
Through the two supply crises surfaced the uncomfortable relationship between, on the one hand, dependency on 
Russia and, on the other, its increasingly unreliable energy profile. Not only did the question of whether an energy 
supply crisis could or would happen again become rather urgent, the supply crises also touched upon the more 
fundamental question of how the EU would be able to reduce its dependency on Russia. The strategy to combat 
these challenges has been outlined through several strategic papers on energy security published by the European 
Commission since 2006. A core component within all of these proposals is the diversification of energy supply: 
by resorting to other partners than Russia for the supply of natural gas, the threat of high dependency on the energy 
partner, perceived as unreliable, could be reduced. In the next section, it will be explained that just as energy 
security forms a central component of EU energy policy, the diversification of energy supply is one of the pillars 
of the EU’s strategy to improve its energy security. 
 
3.2 Diversification of energy supply as part of improving EU energy security 
Energy diversification can be achieved in several ways. As it simply means ‘variation’, a goal related to energy 
diversification could be met by making alterations in the ‘energy mix’, through investing in domestic, renewable 
energy instead of foreign fossil fuels for example. In this thesis however, the emphasis is on the diversification of 
energy supply through relating to other supply partners.  
   From the first comprehensive document on ‘energy security strategy’ published in 2006 onwards, this 
method of diversification, related to choice of energy partners, has been a central component to achieving the goal 
of reducing natural gas dependency on the single largest supplier, Russia. In the 2006 Green Paper on the 
mentioned ‘energy pillars’, the Commission champions the formulation of a “coherent external energy policy”, in 
order to boost EU energy security and to tackle “common problems with energy partners worldwide”.49 The 
“diversifying [of] sources and routes of supply of imported energy” is part of the “integrated approach”, together 
with reducing demand and the diversification of the energy mix through renewable sources.50 
  In succeeding strategic documents on EU energy security, diversification of energy supply has remained 
a core element. In the Second Strategic Energy Review (2008), the Commission revisited the need for increased 
attention towards energy infrastructure and several diversification strategies. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) – 
which entails the connection of Caspian and Middle Eastern gas resources to Europe - was here introduced as “one 
of the EU’s highest energy security priorities”, with Turkey stated as a prominent transit partner with whom 
                                                          
47 Stern, J. ‘The Russian-Ukranian gas crisis of January 2006’, Published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (January 16, 2006) 1. 
48 Pirani, S., Stern, J. & Yafimava, K., ‘The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment’, Published by the 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (February 2009) 62-3. 
49 European Commission, A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy (2006) 14. 
50 Ibidem, 18. 
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agreements on transit should be made.51 However, the SGC is not the only trump card the EU is aiming to play: 
the Baltic Interconnection Plan, establishing the “missing infrastructure” between the EU and Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Mediterranean Ring, linking the EU with the Mediterranean countries in North-Africa, are two 
important examples of this. However, the SGC is stipulated as the most important infrastructure project.52 In the 
2014 European Energy Security Strategy, the diversification of energy supply is mentioned as the 7 th of 8 key 
components formulated to “promote closer cooperation beneficial to all member states” and is discussed in much 
more detail, with regard to the SGC, the possible natural gas capacity in the Caucasus region and the choice of 
energy partners – not only Turkey, but also Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran.53 These strategic documents on 
energy security and the method of diversification of energy supply will be examined more closely as part of the 
framing analysis in chapter 5, in which the focus will lie on Commission communication towards Russia and 
Turkey. 
   
3.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter serves as a concise and necessary starting element in the analysis of EU energy security, the strategy 
of diversification of energy supply and Turkey as a viable energy partner. It introduced energy security as part of 
EU energy policy, fuelled by the experiences of past energy crises in the 1960s and 1970s. Unintentional and 
intentional supply disruptions by producing countries were identified as two fears fuelling the need for EU energy 
security. Diversification of energy supply, by resorting to other energy suppliers and transit states for importing 
natural gas, has been a core component of the EU’s energy security strategy for over 10 years. 
  The next chapter brings us to a review of Russia and Turkey as energy partners: the EU-Russian energy 
relation will be elaborated, as well as the reasons why the EU wishes to diversify. The second section will discuss 
why the EU is looking at Turkey as a means to achieve diversification of energy supply and thus brings us closer 
to answering the research question of whether Turkey constitutes a viable solution to the EU’s objective of 
improving energy security through diversification. 
  
                                                          
51 European Commission, Second Strategic Energy Review (2008) 4-5. 
52 Ibidem, 4-5. 
53 European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy (2014) 3, 15-6. 
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Chapter 4   EU energy partners: an analysis of Russia and Turkey 
The previous chapter explained that energy security is a central component to EU energy policy and that, 
consequently, diversification of energy supply has been formulated as one of the pillars of EU energy security. 
These explanations were necessary to serve as a contextual basis upon which the analysis of Turkey as a viable 
energy partner can be built. This has been brought up due to the EU’s recognition that it is very dependent on an 
energy partner whose reliability is at stake: Russia. This chapter provides the reasons why the EU is seeking to 
diversify from Russia, both energy-related and non-energy related; why Turkey seems attractive to the EU as a 
possible energy partner; and why a possible EU-Turkey partnership in energy is set against the complicated 
background of Turkey’s thus far failed accession process. 
  
4.1 Russia: the EU’s energy (re)liability? 
Russia is the European Union’s main trading partner for energy.54 Graph 1 shows that the levels of dependency of 
natural gas supplies from Russia range in some cases as high as 100%. This data moreover shows that in countries 
such as Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania, natural gas accounts for more than 25% of their energy mix, while Russia 
provides 100% of this gas supply. Overall, the EU imports around 53% of its total energy demand, 66% of its total 
natural gas demand, with Russia accounting for 39% of natural gas imports.55 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Eurostat, table: Main origin of primary energy imports, EU-28, 2003-2013). As found on: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/File:Main_origin_of_primary_energy_imports,_EU-28,_2003%E2%80%9313_(%25_of_extra_EU-
28_imports)_YB15.png, accessed 18 April 2016.  
55 European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy (May 28, 2014) 2. 
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This rate of overdependence creates a certain risk: if gas delivery fails, the consequences may be dire. Moreover, 
if the reputation of the energy partner – Russia - is questionable, a potentially fatal combination arises. The 
arguments why Russia is perceived by the EU as an unreliable (energy) partner can roughly be divided into two 
categories: directly energy-related arguments and indirectly energy-related, geo-political arguments. 
  The energy-related arguments are connected to the fear of a ‘non-intentional’ energy crisis as presented 
in chapter 3.56 The two energy supply crises of 2006 and 2009 showed that it does not require involvement of an 
EU energy partner for damage to be inflicted to European recipients of Russian gas. The crisis of January 2006 
was the result of a “disastrous deterioration in Russian-Ukranian [energy] relations” and was not that unexpected.57 
However, according to experts, no serious harm was done to multilateral energy relations.58 January 2009 brought 
about a new price and transit disagreement between Russia and Ukraine, which led to a new disruption of gas 
flows, this time impacting the EU more severely. The disruption lasted for multiple days, with neither Russia nor 
Ukraine eager to quickly come to resolution of the conflict.59 The same experts who reviewed the 2006 incident 
argued that the political consequences were more dramatic this time: Russia’s reputation as a reliable energy 
supplier was damaged, maybe even beyond repair.60 Rightly so, experts moreover pointed to the fact that for 
European citizens and politicians, it did not matter who was to blame: the image of Russia and Ukraine as 
unreliable energy suppliers is what lasted. 
 
As Pirani et al. noted in the aftermath of the incident of 2009, there is no reason to believe that Russia used energy 
against the EU as a political weapon in the 2006 and 2009 cases.61 However, the deterioration of the relations 
between the European Union and Russia in recent years adds an extra dimension to Europe’s image of Russia as 
its prime, yet at times unreliable energy supplier: can Russia, headed by Putin, be trusted not to use energy as 
economic and/or geopolitical leverage at some point? Here, the second fear, or the intentional use of energy as a 
political weapon becomes significant.  
  Currently, Russia and the EU are closer towards alienation than to rapprochement. Confrontational 
approaches towards the crisis in Ukraine from 2014 onwards attest to this, but the roots for EU-Russian 
estrangement lie deeper. According to Haukkala, there are three reasons to identify for the divergence between the 
EU and Russia, since Putin rose to power at the turn of the millennium: first, close cooperation resulted in the 
“accentuation” of “diverging views” on the way the EU and Russia think about power relations and their spheres 
of influence; secondly, the EU and Russia have “largely incompatible interests”; and third, the EU’s ‘Eastern 
Partnership’ enlargement strategies at its eastern borders, have had increasingly negative effects on EU-Russian 
relations.62 Additionally, Schmidt-Felzmann has argued that the unequal nature of the 1994 Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was the original framework agreement for EU-Russia cooperation after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, from the onset contributed to the divergence. The relationship was never set on equal 
                                                          
56 Hoogeveen & Perlot, ‘The EU’s Policies on Security of Energy Supply Towards the Middle East and Caspian Region: Major Power 
Politics?’ 486-7. 
57 For a detailed discussion on the 2006 gas disruption incident, see: Stern, ‘The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006’, Published by 
the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (January 2006) 5-7. 
58 Stern, ‘The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006’, 14-16. 
59 Pirani, S., Stern J., & Yafimava K., ‘The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment’, Published by the 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (February 2009) 5-7, 21-3, 54-5; Kovacevic, ‘The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Gas Crisis in South 
Eastern Europe’, Published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (March 2009) 2-3. 
60 Pirani, S., Stern J., & Yafimava K., ‘The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment’, 57-9. 
61 Ibidem, 60. 
62 Haukkala, H., ‘From Cooperative to Contested Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU-Russia 
Relations’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 23:1 (2015) 25-40, 31-3. 
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footing, since the EU wanted to follow its own liberal principles towards Russia. While Russia needed the EU 
more than vice versa, the EU dictated, instead of equally cooperated with Russia. Meanwhile, Russia was not 
willing to fulfil all the requirements the EU had set and as a consequence of both stances, only “lip service” was 
paid to the strategic partnership. Due to these “structural asymmetries”, eventually mistrust replaced trust and the 
desired ‘strategic partnership’ collapsed.63 
  Although it is difficult to argue when this strategic partnership exactly collapsed, alienation between the 
EU and Russia was not only fed by the 2006 and 2009 gas disruptions, but also through the Russian-Georgian 
territorial conflicts in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in the summer of 2008, after which the foreign ministers of 
NATO members suspended military and political collaboration and deemed Russia’s actions to be 
“disproportionate and inconsistent with its peacekeeping role.”64 However, the present conflict in Ukraine serves 
as the clearest example of the deterioration, with the EU and Russia at opposite ends of the table.65 Moreover, the 
incidents in Ukraine were actively linked with the risks of EU dependency on Russia in energy affairs by several 
European leaders, for example by the then prime minister of Poland, Donald Tusk:  
 
   Regardless of how the stand-off over Ukraine develops, one lesson is clear: 
   excessive dependence on Russia makes Europe weak. And Russia does not  
   sell its resources cheap – at least, not to everyone.66 
 
 
José Manuel Barroso, in the last months of his European Commission presidency, reinforced Tusk’s viewpoint in 
a speech held at the Energy Security Strategy Conference of May 2014, acknowledging the EU’s dependence on 
Russian energy supplies and calling for a European Energy Policy to be developed. In his opening remarks, he 
faced the issue straightforwardly: 
 
   Today’s conference could not be more topical. With the events in Ukraine, 
   Europe is facing a threat to its peace, stability and security the likes of which 
  we have not seen since the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
    
   The ‘Great Game’ of geopolitics has made an unwelcome return and this is 
   being particularly felt in the realm of energy.67  
 
Clearly, Barroso links the issue of energy with EU-Russian alienation. Although it is rarely mentioned in official 
European Commission documents, as we shall see in chapter 5, the underlying assumption between the described 
long- and short-term political divergence and energy policy is the possibility that in a case of extreme deterioration 
of the relations, Russia uses its energy leverage as a political weapon. Some have argued that Russia indeed has 
used energy as a foreign policy tool, for example in the case of Poland68 in the late 1990s and with regard to 
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(former) vassal states Belarus and Ukraine.69 Moreover, research conducted by the Swedish Defense Research 
Agency outlined that there were multiple cases of energy used as a political weapon, mainly in order to pressurize 
neighbouring countries.70 At the same time, energy experts such as Karen Smith Stegen and Pirani, Stern & 
Yafimava, have persuasively argued that energy as a political weapon might have been used, but has not been 
effective in obtaining political leverage for Russia.71 
  Despite the arguments in favour or against, the element of perception of insecurity in policy-making must 
not be overlooked: following Pointvogl’s arguments, perception in policy-making is important, because it is 
psychological in nature and thus “subject to changes not necessarily based on empirical assessments”.72 Moreover, 
including perceptions of a threat leads to considering worst case scenarios: as these scenarios would have a 
significant impact on several member states, important decisions on policy – e.g. whether to diversify or not – 
might certainly be influenced by them. 
 
In sum, both energy-related and geopolitical arguments have contributed to the EU’s perception of Russia as a 
liability in EU energy security. Turkey has been designated as a potentially important energy partner and transit 
state and fits in the EU’s diversification strategy. In the next section, multiple reasons will be brought forward as 
to why the EU is looking at Turkey for solving their energy question. However, building an EU-Turkey energy 
partnership is not as straightforward as it seems considering Turkey’s difficult accession process. 
 
4.2 Turkey: the perpetual candidate for accession turned energy partner? 
Why would the European Union now turn to Turkey, when trying to reduce their gas dependency on Russia? There 
are several, rather straightforward reasons to mention in this respect.  
  First, Turkey is geographically perfectly positioned between the ‘Caspian’ countries which have an 
abundance of natural gas resources and serve as energy exports, and countries which are lacking sufficient 
resources – the majority of EU member states – and are energy importers. In terms of natural gas, Turkey’s 
neighbour Iran has the single largest proven reserves in the world, more than Russia, while countries in Turkey’s 
vicinity have far less, but still considerable reserves (see table 1). 
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   Table 1. Proven Natural Gas Reserves (end of 2014). BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2015). 
Additionally, as Table 1 shows, Iran harbours an enormous amount of natural gas reserves, which could find its 
way to the EU eventually. In this case, Turkey’s status as a crucial transit state would be reinforced. Currently, 
however, the lack of required infrastructure impedes significant short term results.73 
  Secondly, Turkey and the EU share the same goal of diversifying its gas supplies from Russia. In fact, 
natural gas forms more than one-third of Turkey’s total primary energy supply, with Russia accounting for 58% 
of total natural gas imports.74 After the downing of the Russian figher jet SU-22 in November 2015, relations 
between Turkey and Russia deteriorated rapidly. This led to numerous economic sanctions towards Turkey, 
including the suspension of negotiations on a natural gas pipeline to be constructed underneath the Black Sea.75 
Although the situation with Russia has slowly improved since the beginning of August 2016, their energy relations 
remain fragile. Turkey is looking at the same alternative suppliers for energy as the EU, meaning the Caspian 
region, and by bundling their forces the EU and Turkey could reinforce each other’s efforts. 
  A crucial element in this diversification strategy has already been initiated: the construction of the 
necessary pipeline infrastructure from Azerbaijan, through Turkey, to Greece. Natural gas is most commonly 
transported through pipelines, other than liquefied natural gas, which can also be transported on ships, railway 
tankers and tanker trucks. The whole route from the gas-fields of Azerbaijan to the Adriatic shores of Italy consists 
of several separate infrastructural projects, displayed underneath (image 1). First gas flows from Azerbaijan to 
Georgia and Turkey and later through TAP are expected at the beginning of 2018.76            
 
                                                          
73 Ibidem.   
74 International Energy Agency (IEA), Turkey. Oil and Gas Security. Emergency Response of IEA Countries (2013) 3. 
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 Proven reserves (trillion 
cubic metres)1 
Share in world’s total 
proven reserves (%) 
Iran 34 18,2 
Russia 32,6 17,4 
Turkmenistan 17,4 9,3 
Iraq 3,6 1,9 
Azerbaijan 1,2 0,6 
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    Image 1. The pipeline infrastructure of the Southern Gas Corridor. Source: www.tap-ag.org  
 
These conditions rightly appear to be favourable. By relying more on alternative suppliers through the Southern 
Gas Corridor (SGC), the EU will be able to rely less on Russia and thus reduce the risk of overdependence. For 
the EU, however, durable relations with Turkey are paramount in making this energy partnership work. Turkey’s 
cumbersome accession process however shows that a partnership between the EU and Turkey is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. 
  Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Economic Communities in 1959, which 
eventually resulted in the Ankara Agreement in 1963. In this document, Turkey’s eventual membership of the EEC 
was already mentioned, albeit somewhat tentatively.77 Throughout the subsequent decades, the EU and Turkey 
failed to compose a coherent path towards Turkey’s entrance to the EEC/EU due to multiple reasons, related for 
example to the military coups in Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s, to the question of the division of Cyprus and to 
Turkey’s ‘general political and economic progress’, as the European Commission stated in their Progress Report 
on Turkey in 1989.78 Finally, at the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999, Turkey was accepted as an 
official candidate. Although during the first years the prospects for Turkey entering the EU looked promising, 
largely due to reforms initiated by the newly elected Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, negotiations 
on the so-called ‘chapters’ stalled around 2005. Despite the initiation of the so-called Positive Agenda in 2012 to 
bring “fresh dynamics into the EU-Turkey relations”, thus far negotiations on only 14 of a possible 35 chapters 
were opened and only one was successfully closed.79 In sum, Turkey’s accession process to the EU has been 
running for 33 years, without significant results.80 This complicates the construction of a new energy partnership 
as part of the EU’s diversifications strategy as well, for example as to how this partnership is to be seen: as part 
of, or separate from the accession process? 
  Surprisingly, the refugee crisis related to the war in Syria has brought Turkey’s accession process back 
to life: in return for Turkey’s aid in controlling the flow of illegal refugees from Syria to Europe, the EU awarded 
Turkey with substantial financial aid, the re-opening of talks on visa-liberalisation and, more fundamentally, the 
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re-energizing of talks on Turkey’s accession process, meaning that new ‘chapters’ were to be opened.81 Although 
the deal indeed resulted in a dramatic decrease of the amount of refugees travelling to Europe through Turkey, the 
deal has had particularly negative repercussions as well. For the benefit of the structure of this thesis, this will be 
further outlined in chapter 6. In this chapter, following upon the framing analysis in chapter 5, it will be elaborated 
why a particular set of factors contributes to the fact that a partnership with Turkey in energy affairs might not be 
as desirable as the EU deems it to be. 
 
3.3 Concluding remarks          
In this chapter, Russia’s role in EU energy policy and the reasons for an alternative energy strategy have been 
elaborated upon. Russian gas supply is deemed not to be fully reliable, considering not only the recent regional 
conflicts with Ukraine, but also the recent deterioration in relations between the EU and Russia. It is therefore 
logical that the EU is looking to alter its energy strategy. In this quest for diversification, Turkey constitutes a 
crucial factor in the development of the SGC. This could result in a new partnership between the EU and Turkey. 
This chapter showed also, however, that a partnership between the EU and Turkey has not proved to be successful 
in the past, which still resonates today. The question of whether Turkey’s accession process also forms a negative 
component to Turkey’s desirability as an energy partner is one of the core questions to be answered in chapter 6. 
  In the following chapter 5, a framing analysis will be conducted on EU documents with regard to energy 
security, the diversification of energy supply, and the roles of Russia and Turkey in this respect. This thesis has 
thus far shown that due to Russia’s reliability issues, the EU is looking at alternative energy suppliers and transit 
states, of which Turkey is a prominent one. The next chapter analyses whether and how the EU frames Russia as 
one of their most important energy partner – yet one with a reliability issue - and how they push forward Turkey 
as their new energy partner. Whether this solution to the objective of improving EU energy security through 
diversification is a viable one, will be analysed in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5    Framing Russia, framing Turkey 
Thus far, several steps were taken to come closer to answering the research question formulated in the introduction. 
The literature review and the elaboration on choices for using theory, methodology and methods served as 
foundations and identified how this thesis can contribute to the academic debate on EU energy security by focusing 
on political arguments for the EU to diversify its energy supply away from Russia, towards Turkey. Chapter 3 
outlined the prominent position energy security has gained in EU energy policy and moreover introduced the 
diversification of energy supply as a core element in EU energy security strategy. The previous chapter argued 
that Russia’s reliability is at stake, with fear of new episodes of (un)intentional disruptions of gas supply as a 
driving force. Secondly, Turkey was introduced as a potential energy partner for the EU, while focusing on the 
upsides and simultaneously highlighting Turkey’s difficult accession partnership as an unfavourable predecessor. 
The current chapter continues on the path set out by these previous chapters. 
  In this chapter numerous documents drafted by the European Commission (DG ENER) on energy matters 
after 2006 are analysed in order to conclude how the European Commission ‘frames’ their energy relations with 
both Russia and Turkey. It revolves around several important questions: how does the European Commission 
frame and construct these two different energy relationships? Which kind of frames for analysis are being used 
and which are dominant? Are the same frames being used towards both Russia and Turkey? And, finally, what do 
the answers to these questions say about how the European Commission evaluates and communicates their energy 
relations with these two countries? The first section will focus on Russia-related documents and the second section 
will focus on the Commission’s dealing with Turkey. 
 
5.1 Russia: the EU’s energy (re)liability? 
While analysing the policy documents drafted by DG ENER, a distinction should be made between documents 
drafted with and without Russia. This distinction is important, since this creates two different perspectives for 
analysis: one in which Russia maintains the role of a partner and is part of the writing process of the documents, 
the other in which DG ENER is the only contributor, without Russian consent being necessary. Since both are 
important for the framing of Russia by the EU, both will be part of the analysis. 
  The sources analysed with regard to the first category relate to the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. This 
energy platform was initiated in 2000 and was constructed to develop EU-Russia energy relations on issues such 
as energy trade, sustainability, infrastructure, investment, technology.82  
    In the Progress Report of 2006, energy security is presented as a “key challenge that will remain a central 
issue in the energy cooperation between Russia and the European Union”, while economic issues (“great mutual 
interest”) receives equal attention.83 In the 2007 edition, “the Parties note that ensuring the long-term security and 
safety of energy demand and supplies is becoming the priority issue in the framework of the EU-Russian Energy 
Dialogue” and here, the balance favours the security frame.84 
 The Progress Reports of 2008 and 2009 lean more towards the economic frame: in the edition of 2008, 
statements on security as the key factor of the energy relationship are less strong than in previous editions and the 
majority of the text is aimed at the economic strategic forecasts, the development of energy markets and 
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infrastructure.85 In the 2009 edition, the majority of the text is dedicated to infrastructure and market development. 
On the gas supply disruption of 2009, the EU and Russia state explicitly that they “highly appreciate the Technical 
Terms for Monitoring the Supply of Natural Gas through Ukraine on 10 January 2009 by the Russian Party, the 
European Commission and the Ukrainian side” 86, hereby emphasizing partnership and not divergence. 
  Lastly, the EU-Russia Strategic Review Forecast (2011) and the Roadmap for EU Russian Energy 
Cooperation until 2050 (2013) are useful for analysis, because they focus on the suitability and sustainability of 
partnership of the EU and Russia on energy in the near and far future. The former continues the pattern of the 
Progress Reports of the Energy Dialogue: the dominant frame is economic, with environmental issues on second 
place. Both the introduction and the concluding chapter predominantly focus on developing economic ties and 
trade, supported by the majority of the chapters being economic in character. There is no evident security or 
political agenda being presented.87 The 2006 and 2009 gas crises are rarely mentioned, yet, the reality of 
diversification of supply and demand between Russia and the EU is acknowledged.88 The ambitious ‘roadmap 
towards 2050’ (2013) is exemplary of the overall conclusion to be drawn from the analysed documents: in joint 
EU-Russia documents, the focus lies on the economic frame and, more importantly, on the potential, instead of the 
risk of the EU-Russia energy partnership. In the elaborate introduction to the roadmap, this energy potential is 
carefully crafted by both parties: 
 
   The strategic target by 2050 should be to achieve a Pan-European 
   Energy Space (…) making the necessary contribution to ensuring  
   energy security and reaching the sustainable development goals of  
   the EU and Russia. (…) Such a Pan-European energy space would 
   need to ensure a level playing field and a high level of transparency 
   and safety.89 
 
It becomes evident here as well that the discourse dedicated to security or political elements is far from 
controversial, for obvious reasons. These jointly written documents are exercises in diplomacy: their main goal is 
to cause no controversy. In this sense, it is obvious why a confrontational political frame is completely absent in 
these reports and the security frame only comes forward as a common responsibility. 
 
Do the documents published by the DG ENER, independently from Russia, show a different pattern? Judging by 
the first analysed document, a short yet in-depth analysis of EU-Russian relations as a run-up to the EU-Russian 
summit to be held later that year, it appears to be so. The document was published in November 2008, three months 
after the Russian-Georgian conflict took place, in which Russia and Georgia clashed in the Georgian territories of 
South-Ossetia and Abkhazia. As Fawn & Nalbandov persuasively noted, European leaders however diplomatically 
refrained from attributing guilt to one of the parties.90 In this document, the question of guilt is circumvented, yet 
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the EU’s worries are indeed stipulated: the EU states that the Russian-Georgian territorial conflicts and Russia’s 
statements on ‘spheres of influence’ have cast a ‘serious shadow’ over the EU Russia relationship.91 This political 
frame is also used in a context in which Russia’s dependence on the EU is emphasized, which is different from the 
conclusion of the combined documents analysed above: 
 
   The EU can approach its relationship with Russia with a certain  
confidence. Economically, Russia needs the EU. The EU is an important  
market for its exports of raw materials, notably energy, and Russia  
would like to improve the conditions for trade in nuclear materials. (…)  
The aim of this review is (…) to make a sober assessment of where  
the EU’s own interests now lie.92 
 
While this introduction is more direct than any other document analysed above, the subsection on energy is more 
moderate in wording. In this section, the security frame is dominant. The EU once more nominates energy as a 
core element of the relationship and stresses the interdependence between the two parties, as opposed to Russian 
dependence towards the EU as stated above. Also, the EU raises its concern about the different interpretations on 
energy security and ‘reciprocal market access’, as well as Russia’s quarrels with transit states, concluding that 
cooperation should be built upon “transparency, reciprocity and non-discrimination”.93 Overall, the political and 
security frames are dominant in this document. While not all relates to energy, the EU conveys that in the fragile 
political relations with Russia, energy is a major component to reckon with. 
  The 2008 Second Strategic Energy Review, published by DG ENER also after the South-Ossetia War, 
follows the pattern of the previous document, albeit in generic terms. The subtitle of the energy review, ‘An EU 
Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan’, already reveals that articulating a security policy on energy affairs is 
the main aim and is therefore the dominant frame. Moreover, it nominates energy as a vital component in 
international relations and politics in the section on external energy relations:  
 
  Worldwide, countries are becoming increasingly interdependent 
  in energy matters. (…) Energy must be given the political priority 
  it merits in the EU’s international relations (…). The widely-varying 
  interests of countries in the energy field, in a context of increasing 
  energy interdependence, point to the need for more robust inter- 
  national legal frameworks based on a balance of commitments 
  and benefits, within energy and across economic sectors.94  
 
It is obvious that the majority of this quote relates predominantly (but not only) to Russia: energy is a subject for 
the highest political dialogues. In the text, the EU portrays Russia once more as a partner of utmost importance 
and emphasizes the importance of trust: 
 
Russia will remain the EU's main energy partner far into the  
future and more needs to be done to ensure that this relationship  
is based on trust; each would benefit from consolidating the main  
principles on which this partnership is based into law.95  
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However, the report is not solely fixed upon the security/political dimension of energy policy, but highlights five 
action points (dealing with environmental issues too, for example) for improving EU energy security. This leads 
to the conclusion that the overall dominant frame is security/political, with a secondary role for the environmental 
frame. As explained in the chapter on methodology, the political frame is lying underneath: in the security frame, 
the political frame of power balances between Russia and the EU forms the foundation upon which questions on 
security are founded. 
  Two Commission communications on security of energy supply published in 2011 and 2013 contrast with 
the reports of 2008, as these two reports are predominantly dedicated to the economic aspects of EU external 
energy policy and highlight the importance of equal cooperation between Russia and the EU:  
 
   The EU, instead, must build on the strength of its market,  
expanding links between the European network and  
neighbouring countries and creating a wider regulatory area,  
beneficial for all. (…) This Communication proposes concrete  
ways to extend energy cooperation beyond the mere physical security 
of imports. 96  
 
The specific attention paid to Russia in section 1.4 focuses on the integration of the different energy markets and 
regulatory and legal frameworks for cooperation and it makes the use of the economic frame clear.97 The 2013 
report focuses primarily on economic aspects, while additional elements include the negotiations on future 
cooperation in the EU Russia Energy Roadmap 2050 and the necessity of constructing a solid legal framework.98  
  In the past two years, much has happened in the realm of energy policy and security, as was showed in 
chapter 3 and 4. One report of great importance in this respect is the European Energy Security Strategy, published 
in 2014. Not too surprisingly considering its title, the use of the security frame is clear: “The Strategy sets out 
areas where decisions need to be taken or concrete actions implemented in the short, medium and longer term to 
respond to energy security concerns.”99 Although Russia is mentioned as the EU’s main supplier for oil and gas 
and the risk of overdependence is stated, relations with Russia are barely elaborated upon, as the European Energy 
Security Strategy is much more aimed at aligning the energy policies of the member states and letting a common 
voice be heard in international energy affairs.100 Although the Russo-Ukrainian conflict was already raging at the 
beginning of 2014, there is no connection made between the political divergence of the EU and Russia and the 
EU’s external energy policy.  
  However, the report certainly holds practical elements of crisis and security management as well: short 
term measures to prevent a new gas disruption to the EU during the 2014-2015 winter are recommended, which is 
further elaborated upon in a technical stress-test report on the security of energy supply published late 2014. In 
this report, the risk of a new gas cut-off due to the Russo-Ukrainian territorial conflict is considered to be a realistic 
                                                          
96 European Commission, ‘On Security of energy supply and international cooperation – “The EU Energy Policy: Engaging 
with Partners beyond Our Borders” (2011) 1-3. 
97 European Commission, On Security of energy supply and international cooperation (2011) 8-9. 
98 European Commission, Implementation of the Communication on Security of Energy Supply and International 
Cooperation and of the Energy Council Conclusions of November 2011 (2013) 2, 3, 7-9. 
99 European Commission, European Energy Security Strategy (2014) 3. 
100 Ibidem, 2-20. 
32 
 
possibility, based upon which multiple scenarios are laid out, most notably a six-month disruption of gas supply.101 
Considering that it has been suggested that Russia has used energy as a political weapon before (see chapter 2) 
and the incidents of 2006 and 2009, these types of measures go beyond ordinary risk management. 
  The last document analysed with regard to energy policy and security is the Energy Union Framework 
Strategy (2015). In this document, the European Commission presents its vision on the future of the EU as a single 
actor in energy affairs. In the first section on ‘energy security, solidarity and trust’, the first of five dimensions of 
the Strategy mentioned, the European Commission clearly communicates the connection between political turmoil 
and energy security: “the political challenges over the last months have shown that diversification of energy 
sources, supplies and routes is crucial for ensuring secure and resilient energy supplies to European citizens and 
companies (…)”.102 The European Commission directly refers to the Ukrainian conflict and its consequences for 
EU-Russia relations. The image of altered relations between Russia and the EU is being reinforced by the only 
sentence specifically dedicated to Russia in the Strategy: 
 
   When the conditions are right, the EU will consider reframing 
   the energy relationship with Russia based on a level playing field  
in terms of market opening, fair competition, environmental  
protection and safety, for the mutual benefit of both sides.103 
 
In other words, at the moment the conditions are not right: Russia and the EU are too far removed from each other 
to reconsider their energy relationship in a positive manner. Although it is only a very short element in the 
Framework Strategy, it is nonetheless an important illustration of how the Commission describes their energy 
relations with Russia: avoiding compromising language, while acknowledging the potential risk.  
  Summarizing, politics is connected to security aspects of energy, but Russia is handled with care. Overall, 
the security and the economic frame appear to be the dominant frame used, while the political frame is less clearly 
present but simultaneously functions as a basis for security or economic arguments: whether to cooperate with 
Russia to gain economic benefits, is essentially a political choice. The understandable aim of the Commission 
seems to be not to confront Russia with polemic language. Energy matters are either discussed in technical terms 
or, if security and politics are elements included, by describing relations with Russia rather delicately, as we saw 
in the second section of documents. Russia is not outspokenly being framed by DG ENER as its political adversary, 
but the possibility of new (un)intentional gas supply disruptions (or cut-offs) caused by Russia is still part of the 
scope of security analyses and it is presented as the prime reason for diversification of supply routes.104 Russia is 
thus presented as a partner and, between the lines, as the root cause for the need for diversification. 
  Here, the connection with the second section of analysis can be made: the EU’s view on Turkey as a 
transit state through which the aim of diversification of gas supply can be accomplished. Is Turkey being portrayed 
as the EU’s new reliable partner, where Russia has failed to do so? 
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5.2. Turkey: the new energy partner? 
Source analysis of DG ENER material on Turkey is rather different from the analysis on Russia-related material. 
Most importantly, sources are far more scarce. Cooperation on energy affairs between the EU and Turkey has a 
much shorter history than that of the EU and Russia and therefore less has been produced. Moreover, Turkey plays 
a different role: it is a transit state for energy and not an actual supplier and therefore figures less prominently in 
DG ENER reporting than suppliers, such as Norway, Algeria or Russia. In this analysis, I mainly resorted to joint 
declarations of ambitions, the Commission Progress Reports and the general DG ENER documentation which 
were also analysed above. 
  Energy has figured more prominently in EU-Turkey affairs for around four years. In 2012, the Positive 
Agenda (PA) was launched to reinvigorate the Turkish accession process, with energy as one of its major 
components. In the joint statement on the energy aspects of the PA, the ‘common challenges’ regarding security 
of supply and competitive markets are mentioned, as is the image of Turkey as an ‘energy bridge and potential 
energy hub’ for the EU.105 The economic frame receives the most attention (market integration and the construction 
of infrastructure), while environmental issues finish second. The security frame is not absent, but is used 
minimally: only the “shared long term priorities as regards security of supply” is mentioned in this respect.106 On 
the foundations of the Positive Agenda, the High Level Energy Dialogue (HLED) for ‘strategic energy 
cooperation’ was constructed. In contrast to the previous setting however, the HLED is communicated as 
predominantly revolving around Turkey’s role in the EU’s strategy of diversification, with ‘ensuring competitive 
energy markets’ mentioned second.107 At the first evaluation on the HLED in 2016, the security frame is 
pronounced even more outspoken: 
 
   Both sides underlined the importance of Turkey as a key 
  country for EU’s energy security and as a regional energy 
  hub, and they re-affirmed their joint commitment to the 
  successful implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor.108 
 
Moreover, Turkey commits itself to “fulfil its responsibilities in terms of contributing to EU’s security of supply 
through various pipelines and interconnection projects”.109 Besides the dominant security frame, there is also room 
for politics: in both the 2015 and 2016 HLED communications, enhanced energy cooperation is linked with 
Turkey’s accession process and the chapter on energy. This is most evident in the 2015 edition. Here, it is 
emphasized that the HLED “is not a substitute to [sic], but a complement and support of Turkey’s accession 
process”, which indicates that while Turkey accepts its important role in EU security of energy supply through the 
HLED, this process should not interfere with the key framework of EU-Turkey cooperation: the accession process 
of Turkey to the EU.110 Although the EU apparently complies with Turkey in this declaration, there is a dilemma 
lingering for the member states here: if the EU wants to pursue a strong and durable energy relationship with 
Turkey on their side, it should use the accession process as the only framework. Turkey’s accession, however, is 
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still highly contested within the EU and opening chapter 15 of the accession framework is not an issue taken 
lightly. 
  Overall, in these few recent joint declarations, the security frame is leading, while there is less room for 
the economic frame. Below, documents drafted by DG ENER alone will be analysed, to weigh whether these 
resemble the picture painted by the joint documents. 
  As mentioned in the methodology, source material by the Commission on Turkey is scarcer and mostly 
related to Turkey’s accession process. In this analysis, the Progress Reports (2006-2009-2012-2015) on Turkish 
EU accession will be discussed. Additionally, similar to the analysis on Russia, Turkey’s role in the Second 
Strategic Energy Review (2008), European Energy Security Strategy (2014) and the Energy Union Framework 
Strategy (2015) will be analysed.  
  The Progress reports touch upon a multitude of subjects on Turkish accession. In the chapter on energy, 
Turkish alignment with the acquis is discussed. The analysis of the Progress Reports shows that in the period of 
time between 2006 and 2015, energy gained a more prominent position and more emphasis was placed on security 
of supply. In the reports of 2006 and 2009, the Commission communicates that Turkey’s progress on energy and 
the security of supply is minimal. The reports focus mainly on internal energy market, energy efficiency and 
nuclear energy reforms and conclude that overall, “alignment [with the acquis] is uneven”.111 Here, the cooperation 
on energy issues is mainly framed as economic and environmental. 
 A different description arises from the reports of 2012 and 2015. While absent in the previous two reports, 
the mentioning of energy cooperation in the introductory summaries to both reports indicates that the subject 
gained in importance. In 2012, energy is communicated as a ‘common challenge’ and an ‘area of common interest’, 
while in 2015 the launch of the High Level Energy Dialogue is mentioned.112 Moreover, the content of chapter 15 
on energy is much more aimed towards security of supply as its main element: the report of 2012 describes the 
birth of the TANAP project between Azerbaijan and Turkey and repeats that “Turkey has the potential to play a 
pivotal role in diversifying resources and routes for oil and gas transit (…)”.113 The 2015 report mentions 
underlines the ‘major role’ Turkey may fulfil as a gas transit country in terms of security of supply, if a “fair and 
transparent gas transit regime” is set up in line with the EU acquis.114 Overall, the switch from the economic frame 
(2006, 2009) to the security (of energy supply) frame (2012, 2015) in this period of time is evident. 
 After having analysed the Progress Reports, the analysis now turns to the general DG ENER energy 
strategy documentation. Turkey’s role in the Second Strategic Energy Review (2008) aligns with the conclusion 
of the 2006 and 2009 Progress Reports: Turkey is only mentioned in rather generic terms and does not play a 
pivotal role in the documentation.115 While this changed in the Progress Reports towards 2015, analysis of the 
2014 European Energy Security Strategy (2014) shows that Turkey is still only mentioned briefly as an important 
country in terms of gas infrastructure (TANAP) and is not framed in any particular way.116 
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  As for the 2015 Energy Union Framework Strategy, the previous analysis on Russia already showed that 
political reality is being connected with the subject of energy security. The Commission elaborates on this in 
another section of the same document, related to diversification of supply routes and thus Turkey:  
 
  Energy policy is often used as a foreign policy tool, in  
particular in major energy producing and transit countries.  
This reality has to be taken into account when discussing  
Europe's external energy policy. (…) As part of a revitalised 
European energy and climate diplomacy, the EU will use 
all its foreign policy instruments to establish strategic energy 
partnerships with increasingly important producing and transit 
countries or regions such as (…) Turkey.117 
 
In this quote, Turkey, energy security and foreign and security policy are openly being connected: the picture 
which the Commission is trying to paint of Turkey is that of an indispensable partner in their quest for 
diversification. Economic and environmental aspects are secondary in this respect.  
 
5.3 Concluding remarks 
What is there to be concluded from the analyses of all of these reports? The analysis showed that in the case of 
Russia, especially in recent accounts, the Commission considers new (un)intentional gas disruptions as a 
possibility, partly because of the turmoil between Russia and Ukraine and the recent deterioration between the EU 
and Russia. However, in the documents analysed, Russia is being handled with care: much more emphasis is being 
placed upon the partnership with Russia, instead of the risk. In these documents, it is clear that the EU seeks to 
avoid any confrontation. 
  Simultaneously, the documents show that the European Commission pursues a diversification strategy, 
with Turkey as one of the pivotal players. Thus, two different faces of the Commission appear: one showing 
diplomatic language and a diplomatic image of Russia, while the other face shows the development of relying less 
on Russia through diversification and new partnerships. Using only official documentation has both benefits and 
drawbacks: an ‘official image’ of a subject can be distilled, but whether this represents what ‘Brussels’ truly thinks 
is less clear. Future research based on complementary research methods, such as conducting interviews, could 
provide us with a more precise answer to this question. 
  In documents related to Turkey, especially after 2012, Turkey is framed mainly as a security partner. If, 
as the joint declarations by Turkey and the EU state, cooperation on energy is to take place within the framework 
of accession, there is still ample work to be done. One important aspect is the fact that the chapter on energy is 
still closed, while another is that the current political circumstances in and between Turkey and the EU paint a 
troublesome picture regarding Turkey’s own political stability and reliability. In the next and final chapter, the 
question will be answered of whether the image of Turkey as a key to the EU’s energy security, makes sense 
considering these internal and external political circumstances. 
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Chapter 6   Turkey: a stable and reliable energy partner? 
In this sixth chapter, the focus is on Turkey. The previous chapter showed that in documentation on energy affairs 
the Commission puts forward Turkey as a quintessential energy security partner. Before proceeding towards 
stating the aim of this chapter, it is worth reiterating what the EU is trying to achieve with respect to diversification 
of energy supply. In the introduction, it was shown that the EU has established a problem related to its energy 
security: it is highly dependent on Russia, but simultaneously does not fully trust Russia as an energy supplier and 
fears that Russia might use energy as a political weapon. As a solution, the EU is looking at Turkey and this 
analysis, therefore, is about whether the EU is likely to achieve its goal of improving its energy security through 
Turkey. 
  As has been established, the EU’s problems with regard to Russia have to do with political reliability. In 
order to assess accurately whether Turkey would form a better alternative than Russia, the same questions should 
be asked: do the internal and external political circumstances in Turkey give rise to the notion that Turkey’s 
political reliability is (un)questionable? In other words, is it to be concluded that Turkey indeed is the reliable and 
stable energy security partner the EU has nominated it to be, as seen in the previous chapter? These questions will 
be answered in two sections: one related to Turkey’s current internal developments, the other related to Turkey’s 
recent developments in external affairs. 
 
6.1 Internal chaos: Political polarization, the coup d’etat and multiple factors of violence 
The domestic political situation in Turkey is one of deep polarization, with three political factions competing over 
power:  the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a conservative, religious party with an even more dominant 
head figure, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; the Republican People’s Party (CHP), a social-democratic party following 
the republican ideal of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which upholds a strong 
Kurdish identity and champions minority rights in general.  
  The AKP has been the dominant political power for over fourteen years, with the current president 
Erdoğan as its founder and champion. Ever since their first entry into Turkish parliament in 2002, the AKP had a 
comfortable majority in parliament and could rule autonomously, with CHP as its traditional, rather toothless 
political adversary. The Gezi-movement - which started in 2013 as a local protest by mostly young Turks against 
reconstruction plans on Taksim Square in Istanbul, later evolved into a large-scale anti-establishment and anti-
Erdoğan movement and was answered with force by the Turkish authorities. The protest movement spreading 
across the country already showed the discontent and divisions in Turkish society, yet, these challenges towards 
the AKP leadership never reached the realm of political representation.  
  The rise of the pro-Kurdish HDP during the June 2015 elected meant that autonomous AKP rule in Turkey 
was contested for the first time in twelve years. However, a political coalition could not be formed, which led to 
new elections to be held in November 2015. The AKP regained their majority during these tumultuous, but as 
legitimate deemed elections, despite the verdict of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) that there were several impediments to a fair course of the elections to be noted, mainly to the detriment 
of the opposition party HDP. 118 Ever since, the AKP has pursued the creation of the executive presidency to 
strengthen Erdoğan’s position and has sought confrontation primarily with its political adversaries, notably CHP 
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and HDP, while the Turkish economy has been performing worse and economic reconstruction is needed.119 The 
continuing rule of Erdoğan and his AKP has created deep divisions in Turkish society: supporters claim his 
superiority and herald him as their saviour, while his opponents detest his ‘sultanesque’, authoritarian style of 
leadership, most vividly illustrated by the ‘Ak Saray’ (White Palace), the enormous presidential complex where 
Erdoğan resides.120 Allegations of corruption are explained by his supporters as attempts to undermine his 
democratically vested power, while for his adversaries these allegations are signs of the corrupted nature of his 
leadership.121 Furthermore, his tendency to prosecute various media organizations critical of the state leadership 
and thus Erdoğan himself122 have resulted in rallies and protests in Turkey, but has been signalled and experienced 
abroad as well, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter. 
  However, the most worrisome element to the EU in the context of stability and political leadership must 
be the recent attempted coup d’état by the Turkish military to overthrow Erdoğan’s rule. The coup failed rather 
quickly, yet the consequences proved to be more far-reaching: thousands of (alleged) supporters of Fethüllah 
Gülen, Erdoğan’s friend-turned-nemesis blamed for orchestrating the coup, were suspended and/or arrested, 
including military and police personnel, journalists, academics and diplomats123; and Erdoğan’s grip on Turkey 
fastened even more, with thousands of pro-Erdoğan protestors, following upon Erdoğan’s request, roaming the 
Istanbul streets in the ensuing days, stating their loyalty towards the Turkish leadership. Meanwhile, the EU and 
Turkey clashed on Erdoğan’s statement that re-introducing the death penalty should not be ruled out.124 It is fair 
to argue that the introduction of the death penalty would mean a virtual end to Turkey’s accession process, as the 
abolition of capital punishment is a vital and non-negotiable component to EU agreements on human rights. On a 
more general level, the coup is an example of Turkey’s unpredictability and Erdoğan’s ferocious, yet carefully 
crafted way of responding to challenges, which on the whole sets him back as an ideal partner in any respect, 
including energy.  
  The attempted coup seems to be a culmination of the contested leadership of Erdoğan’s AKP. However, 
it provided Erdoğan with the opportunity to eliminate his opponents swiftly, hereby fastening his grip on Turkey 
and alienating Turkey from the EU. Societal and political polarization keep festering both in- and outside the 
Turkish parliamentary chambers. Added to these political problems, another great factor of Turkish instability lies 
in the increasing violence occurring on Turkish soil since the summer of 2015, carried out by three challengers 
towards the Turkish state: the PKK, the TAK and IS. 
  Multiple attacks by these three parties over the course of the last two years lead to the conclusion that 
security in Turkish society is under threat. The sense of insecurity due to the fact that ‘danger’ may come from 
one of these three (or perhaps even more) sides is being multiplied by its unpredictability: the next terrorist attack 
is to be expected, but is never announced. The attacks by IS -  in Suruç in July 2015, resulting in the death of 32 
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youngsters protesting against the Syrian conflict; in Ankara in October 2015 killing 103 civilians during a march 
promoting peace and freedom; and very recently on Atatürk Airport in Istanbul, killing 41 citizens – proved to be 
the most violent episodes. Horrendous as they may be, these are incidents. The conflict with the PKK is a severe, 
structural conflict which divides the whole of Turkish society, which is embodied by the political polarization 
between the AKP. It is therefore far more destabilizing for Turkish society than the terrorist attacks and is yet 
another illustration to Turkey’s current internal instability.125   
 
6.2 External confrontations: ‘refugees as bargaining chips’ and ‘sultan Erdoğan?’ 
The previous section focused upon the problems Turkey is facing internally. While this may raise the EU’s concern 
as to the stability of its future partner, the factor of reliability is perhaps of even more importance: can Turkey be 
trusted to serve as a reliable energy transit partner, or will the EU end up with Turkey in a similar situation as it is 
in with Russia? 
  As was shown in chapter 4, the EU and Turkey share a troublesome history and are still entangled in a 
difficult accession process. In the last few years, Turkey-EU cooperation has also not been rather fruitful, while 
the EU has been critical towards Turkey on multiple occasions, notably in the annual Progress Reports. In these 
reports, which elaborate on Turkey’s adherence towards the acquis communautaire, the section on ‘political 
criteria’ has most notably articulated the EU’s worry about the internal state of political affairs in Turkey. In the 
2014 and 2015 reports, the Commission expressively raised their concern towards the slow pace of reform in 
general, ‘allegations of corruptions’ related to high-level government officials, the ‘independence of the judiciary 
and the rule of law’, the ‘deteriorating security situation’ and the ‘significant backsliding in the areas of freedom 
of expression and assembly’ amongst others.126 The mentioned coup d’état and its repercussions will certainly not 
help improve these verdicts. The Progress Reports on Turkey of the last few years show a downhill pattern with 
regard to Turkey’s adherence to the EU’s political criteria, which signals that EU values and Turkish values are 
only drifting more and more apart. 
 Despite these concerns, the outbreak of the refugee crisis has catapulted EU-Turkey cooperation right 
back into the spotlight and has tested the quality of the relationship. The large influx of Syrian immigrants, fleeing 
the Syrian civil war and travelling to Europe through Turkey, sparked heavy debates and has caused deep 
polarization in multiple EU-countries. In order to ‘regulate’ the stream of refugees, several European leaders, led 
by German Chancellor Merkel, resorted to the aid of Turkey in March 2016. The subsequent ‘refugee-deal’ struck 
between the EU and Turkey signified the elevation of Turkey as a crucial partner for Europe: in exchange for 
implementing a ‘one-for-one’-principle - meaning that each illegal migrants arriving in the EU through Turkey 
would be exchanged for a legal migrant coming from one of the designated refugee camps - the EU guaranteed an 
increase in financial aid, the speeding up of the visa liberalisation process and ‘new energy’ to be put in the 
accession process.127 Thus, EU-Turkey cooperation intensified. However, three worrying factors with regard to 
cooperation with Turkey surfaced recently.  
  First, over the course of the last months, Erdoğan has approached the refugee deal as fundamentally quid 
pro quo and he uses the leverage he acquired – control over Syrian refugees travelling over land from Syria through 
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Turkey to Europe – as the ultimate bargaining tool. This is to the great discomfort of critics towards the deal, such 
as Dutch MEP and Turkey-rapporteur Kati Piri. She argued that none of the so-called Copenhagen-criteria, which 
test fundamental requirements for joining the EU, such as democratic governance, respect for human rights and a 
market economy, can be part of a bargain, especially considering the above described Turkish backslide in 
corruption and fundamental freedoms.128 Meanwhile, Erdoğan more than once threatened to terminate the refugee 
deal if the visa liberalisation process and the opening up of new accession chapters were not followed through.129 
  Through recent events, the EU must be well aware of the risk that Erdoğan might break the deal if his 
demands are not met. Erdoğan has realised that maintaining control on the influx of refugees through the deal with 
Turkey is of such importance to many EU-countries, that as a result his position of influence in the EU has 
increased considerably, a position which he uses to support his own agenda. One prime example of Erdoğan’s 
‘long arm to Europe’ is the escalation of the Böhmermann-case, in which Erdoğan continued to pursue his policy 
of not tolerating satire aimed at himself, this time in Germany.130 German Chancellor Merkel reacted somewhat 
restrainedly to the incidents in order not to antagonize Erdoğan and upset the precarious refugee deal.131 
  Secondly, serious doubts have been cast over Turkey’s compliance with the refugee deal. Based on 
testimonies gathered in Turkey’s south-east border regions with Syria, Amnesty International and Dutch news 
agency NOS reported that Syrian refugees were sent back to Syria by Turkey in an attempt to curb the amounts of 
legal registrations in Turkish refugee camps.132 In a subsequent interview broadcast on Dutch television, the 
Turkish ambassador in the Netherlands vehemently denied the allegations and stated that with terrorism at its 
border, it is obvious why Turkey performs strict border controls.133 For foreign political authorities, the accusations 
are very difficult to examine. However, the possibility of Turkish violation of the deal can already have a negative 
effect on Turkey’s image as a partner for the EU. 
  For the purpose of this thesis, the Turkish policy of using the refugee deal in order to force concessions 
by the EU is crucial. In chapter 4, it was shown that Russia using energy as a bargaining tool, or as a political 
weapon, is one of the reasons why the EU seeks to improve its energy security. Although the situations are not 
exactly the same, Turkish policy with regard to the refugee deal resembles this use of political leverage and 
therefore indicates the possibility that resorting to Turkey will result in another energy partnership for the EU with 
a partner whose reliability is at least questionable.  
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6.3 Concluding remarks 
This chapter showed that Turkey is not only politically polarized and that president Erdoğan’s political primacy is 
both undeniable and controversial, but also clarified that domestic security is being heavily undermined by threats 
coming from multiple distinct parties. Turkey is momentarily rather unstable, most vividly illustrated by the recent 
attempted coup d’état, and there are few reasons to assume that Turkey’s instability will improve in the short term. 
The resurgence of Turkish-Kurdish violence in the south-east and the subsequent political and societal polarization 
should be described as ‘self-inflicted’ chaos and a solution seems far away. The Turkish leadership seems to prefer 
confrontation over reconciliation.  
  Moreover, the second section illustrated that Turkey’s relations with the EU have intensified immensely 
through the refugee deal, while it similarly revealed the uneasiness of having Turkey as a partner. Erdoğan 
exploited Turkey’s elevated bargaining position by openly pressuring the EU to meet his demands and to counter 
political satire against him, beyond the Turkish border. His confrontational expressions towards the EU and his 
threats to end the refugee deal if his demands are not met, lead to the unpleasant possibility, from the EU’s point 
of view, that in the case the energy partnership is constructed and Erdoğan’s demands are not met or his position 
is undermined by his European partners, he might use his leverage on energy supply as well. In the case of energy, 
the use of political leverage by Russia was one of the prime reasons for the EU to seek to reduce its dependence 
on Russia. Effectively, this situation would mean that the EU’s strategy of diversification in order to improve its 
security of energy supply, will have failed, since Turkey’s reliability is at much at stake as Russia’s.  
  The developments which were described above beg the question whether Turkey currently fits the EU as 
its new energy partner. When referring to the initial question of this chapter, it appears that the image of Turkey 
as the EU’s new, reliable partner in diversification of energy supply is being compromised by both internal chaos 
and external confrontations. In the following conclusion, a balanced answer will be given to the central research 
question of this analysis: Is Turkey a viable solution to the EU’s objective of improving energy security through 
diversification? 
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Conclusion 
Improving the EU’s security of energy supply has been nominated as one of the top policy priorities by the 
European Commission, due to high dependency on an energy partner whose reliability has been contested: Russia. 
In order to find a solution to the objective of improving EU energy security, the EU has formulated an energy 
security strategy, within which diversification of energy supply is a significant factor. In this search for alternative 
energy partners, the EU is looking at Turkey to engage in a new energy (transit) partnership. This research focused 
on the question whether Turkey is a viable solution to the EU’s objective of improving its energy security through 
diversification. 
  This thesis started with a review of the existing literature on energy security, diversification of energy 
supply and the role Turkey could play in this respect. It showed that although the emphasis in the majority of the 
scholarly work is placed on political arguments for the EU to diversify from Russia, academics who have worked 
on Turkey’s role in the EU’s energy security strategy have neglected to pay sufficient attention to the basis political 
principles which have to be met by the EU’s new energy partner – if Russia’s political unreliability is the main 
reason for diversification, avoiding the same unreliability issues with a new energy partner should be paramount 
for the EU. Therefore, this thesis intends to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the question of whether the 
EU’s conveyed image of Turkey as a crucial energy security partner, by the EU, matches with an independent 
analysis of Turkey’s stability and reliability. Moreover, this research evidences that in future research on energy 
security and diversification strategies, it is worth comparing and contrasting EU discourse on both negatively and 
positively viewed energy partners, applying the same political principles to find inconsistencies and thus, to fill 
gaps in the existing energy security literature.   
  To provide this analysis with a solid foundation, the second chapter provided a suitable theoretical and 
methodological framework. Here, securitization theory was linked with discourse analysis and the method of 
‘framing’. Securitization theory was important to this research as it stipulates the importance of the use of specific 
discourse to indicate a ‘threat’, related to a specific partner like Russia, while it can also indicate a ‘solution’ – 
Turkey, in this case. In this research, therefore, a ‘framing’ analysis, which is a specific type of discourse analysis, 
was conducted on official EU documentation by the Commission towards both Russia and Turkey, to assess how 
the Commission conveys images of Russia and Turkey as the EU’s (potential) energy partners, which frames are 
used and how these are similar or different. The second chapter set the stage for the rest of this research. 
  Chapter 3 and 4 provided the necessary context to the research question. It was explained that energy 
security is a crucial part of EU energy policy and that the strategy of diversification primarily relates to the 
Southern Gas Corridor, of which Turkey as a transit state is an essential part. The fourth chapter provided an 
analysis of the current state of energy affairs between Russia and the EU and explained what the biggest 
impediments to Russia’s reliability as an energy supplier are. Also, it introduced the reasons why the EU is looking 
at Turkey as an energy partner, while it also narrated past EU-Turkey relations and the Turkey’s cumbersome 
accession process, which revealed that an EU-Turkey partnership has already not been as straightforward to 
achieve as it might seem. 
  The framing analysis in chapter 5 on DG ENER documentation showed that Russia is being handled with 
care: the security and economic frames are dominant, but confrontational discourse or political influences in the 
documentation are largely absent. The EU evidently attempts to emphasize its (economic) ties with Russia, instead 
of presenting Russia as a liability. Given the deeply problematic EU-Russia relationship already outlined, it must 
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be concluded that a deliberately cautious approach was employed by the Commission, which would be consistent, 
of course, with its highly technocratic, and therefore non-political role. The framing analysis with regard to Turkey 
showed that the security frame was dominant in these documents and that Turkey is presented as being of high 
value to the EU’s energy security, while economic or environmental issues play inferior roles. Turkey is presented 
as a key player in the EU’s diversification strategy: no political objections to this notion are mentioned, which 
clashes with the findings of the sixth, and final chapter of this thesis. 
  Chapter 6 focused on the desirability of Turkey as the EU’s new energy partner. Analysis of both recent 
internal developments in Turkey and current external developments in EU-Turkey relations revealed that Turkey 
is politically rather fragile: internally, Turkey suffers from deep political and societal polarization, culminating in 
the recently attempted coup d’état by the Turkish military, which was struck down the sitting president Erdoğan 
and his supporters. Turkish political instability is enhanced furthermore by the resurgence of violence between the 
Kurdish PKK and the Turkish state and by the recent terrorist attacks by IS and ‘TAK’. Externally, the war in 
Syria caused a ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe, leading to the conclusion of a contested ‘quid pro quo’ refugee deal 
between Turkey and the EU. Erdoğan exploited Turkey’s new elevated bargaining position thoroughly, not only 
by openly pressurizing the EU to rapidly follow up on promises made with regard to visa liberalisation and re-
energizing the stalled accession process, but also by intervening in political satire directed towards him in Germany 
and the Netherlands. All this suggests that Turkey should, like Russia, be viewed with caution. 
 
Concluding, is Turkey a viable solution to the EU’s objective of gaining energy security through diversification 
of energy supply? While there certainly are some elements in favour of an EU-Turkey energy partnership, the 
answer to the question is dominated by negative aspects. Yes, Turkey has the geographical advantage of being 
situated in between resource-rich (Caspian region) and resource-poor regions (the EU) and yes, a successful 
partnership in energy affairs could set an example to other common policy areas, but it is questionable whether 
these pros weigh up to the cons.  
  An important objection to nominating Turkey as a viable and better alternative to Russian gas is embodied 
by the current Turkish leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Considering his statements to terminate the refugee deal if 
his demands on visa liberalisation were not met and Erdoğan’s diplomatic interventions on foreign political satire 
aimed towards him, it is not unimaginable that, in an instance where the stakes are high enough, he would use his 
leverage on energy as a political strategy – energy as a political weapon. Effectively, this would result in a situation 
in which two, instead of one, undesirable partnerships would be in place. If improving their energy security entails 
that the reliability of its supplier and transit states should be high, it is questionable as to what extent the EU would 
be aided by relying on Turkey.  
  Although Erdoğan could indeed be labelled as a political liability for the EU, some of Turkey’s problems 
are more structurally harmful for an intensive partnership. The resurgence of violence between the Turkish state 
and the Kurdish PKK has clarified that a solution for the conflict which has been raging for over three decades 
seems far away, even if Erdoğan would be replaced. The conflict not only destabilizes the south-eastern regions 
of Turkey, but causes polarization throughout Turkish society, including the highest political chambers. Moreover, 
the Progress Reports on Turkey by the European Commission have shown that especially on the political criteria, 
predominantly freedom of expression, media freedom and independence of the judiciary, Turkey is performing 
worse each year, which means that the gap between fundamental EU values and Turkish values, is widening. 
43 
 
Lastly, the most prominent indicator of Turkey’s instability and a new rift between the EU and Turkey is the recent 
coup d’état and Erdoğan’s harsh repercussions as a consequence, with the possible introduction of the death penalty 
as a possible “red-line” for the EU, in terms of Turkish accession to the EU and, in the context of this thesis, future 
Turkish partnerships.  
  The EU risks falling in the trap of not learning its lessons from the past: while it deems that Russia is 
politically unreliable and that therefore other energy partners should be sought, it risks choosing another partner 
whose reliability is questionable, Turkey. This potential energy partner is already using its political leverage on 
another subject, the refugee crisis, to force EU concessions, which harms its credibility and reliability in relation 
to a future energy partnership as well. In sum, despite the logic of the diversification strategy and resorting to 
Turkey as the key, Turkey constitutes in the best case an awkward partner. In the worst case, however, they are 
potentially a liability similar to Russia, leading the EU back to square one and keeping the necessity of improving 
its security of energy supply very much alive. 
  Future research in this context could be conducted in several directions. Clearly, this research evidenced 
that new academic work on EU energy security and possible energy partners needs to include political realities, 
likelihoods of reliability of energy partners and lessons learned from the past, especially related to the Russian 
case. Using other research methods, such as interviews with high-level EU officials, might elucidate more in terms 
of the used discourse in this context and the intentionality behind it. This research showed that importing natural 
gas, whether through Russia or Turkey, will remain problematic, predominantly due to political reasons. The EU 
should therefore prioritize and academics could examine the possibilities of altering the EU’s energy mix to a 
concoction in which the chosen energy resources can be distributed securely to all EU citizens, while minimalizing 
the need to rely on (potentially) unreliable partners. 
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